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Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial
Intent and Restrictive Application
Thomas S. Cook*
The most controversial topic in workers' compensation law during
the past decade has been whether work-related mental disability caused
by nonphysical occupational stress is compensable. Both physical injury
resulting from unusual job stress and strain and mental disability stem-
ming from this physical injury have largely been held to be compensable.
But courts and legislatures are reluctant to compensate mental disability
resulting from job stress in the absence of a physical injury or its
equivalent. Although many states allow such recovery on a limited basis,
they still have imposed restrictive requirements by statute or by case law
designed to limit the number of such claims. This Article will show that
the current controversy surrounding stress-related mental disability
workers' compensation claims reflects the conservatism which has
marked the development of workers' compensation systems in the
United States since their beginnings earlier in this century. The central
conflict of workers' compensation lies between judicial desire to liberally
construe such remedial statutes and the public's perceived need to im-
pose limits on their application. These limits arise out of fears of creat-
ing a pervasive employer-paid social insurance scheme which would
compensate disability whether or not employment-related.
This Article will show that each advance in workers' compensation
law which recognizes and compensates a cause or source of employee
disability has been met with judicial or statutory resistance and corre-
sponding attempts to limit the extent to which workers' compensation
would be expanded. The development of an expanded definition of
physical injury beyond an accidental injury to include cumulative trauma,
heart conditions, and the first occupational disease claims was initially
profoundly limited. Each of these areas engendered the same concerns
which are presently raised in conjunction with workers' compensation
claims for mental stress. For each, there has been a slow development
from a very narrow interpretation of work relatedness to, eventually, a
more expansive view. Study of these past developments in workers' com-
pensation law has more than mere historical importance. The social and
economic concerns underlying changing treatment of physical injury and
occupational disease are central to the discussion of whether mental disa-
bility caused by mental injury should be compensable within the meaning
of state workers' compensation statutes.
It can be predicted that, on the basis of past experience, states will in
the future be less insistent in erecting unnecessarily restrictive threshold
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requirements to workers' compensation stress claims. Such require-
ments, formerly employed to restrict cumulative injuries, many occupa-
tional diseases, and heart conditions are not jusitified in view of the
liberal intent to be accorded workers compensation claims. Stress claims
will never be treated on the same basis as physical injury claims due to
economic concerns and inherent suspicion as to their validity.
I. The Origins of Workers' Compensation and Its Theory: Injuries
'"Arising Out Of" Employment
Prior to the advent of workers' compensation statutes a worker's sole
remedy when injured at work was to sue his employer in tort. The em-
ployer was charged with the duty to use reasonable care in providing a
safe workplace with a concomitant duty to warn employees of known
dangers.I As a practical matter, at common law the defenses of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule pro-
vided almost insurmountable barriers for the injured employee seeking
damages. 2 Experts estimate that more than eighty percent of all injured
workers recovered nothing. 3 America's rapid industrialization and the
resulting increase in industrial accidents focused attention on the inequi-
ties of applying the common law of torts to the workplace. 4
Increased public awareness of the hazards of the workplace came at
a time when court decisions weakened the traditional defenses to tortious
causes of action and increased the potential liability of employers. 5 This
resulted in a climate favorable to the adoption of compensation schemes
which balanced the competing interests of business and labor.6 Workers'
compensation statutes were not the first attempt to solve social and legal
problems caused by industrial accidents. Insurance companies offered
employer liability policies against employee negligence suits which for
the period 1906-10 accounted for one hundred million dollars in premi-
ums. 7 The growing cost of accidents to employers due to mounting in-
surance rates led them to prefer the definite and predictable costs of a
1 See Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen s Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 Duq.. L. REV.
349 (1976).
2 See Manson, W1orkmen s Compensation and the Disabling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 376 (1962).
3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.30, at 27 (1985).
4 The evils of the common-law remedies, which were not noticeable in the days of small
and scattered shops, few employees, and simple tools, became intolerable in the days of
crowded factories, equipped with complicated and dangerous machinery. The changes in-
cident to this industrial development had not only largely increased the opportunities for
avoidable injury, but had multiplied the dangers of inevitable accidents .... "The applica-
tion of principles of the common law to suits for personal injuries sustained in hazardous
employments resulted in many cases in injustice; . . . it filled the courts with litigation; it
became the fruitful source of perjury; it engendered bitterness between employer and em-
ployee; it resulted in... economic waste, and it turned out an army of maimed and helpless
people as dependents upon the charity of friends or the public .... [T]he loss has fallen on
those least able to bear it ......
Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 80 N.H. 194, 196, 115 A. 449, 451 (1921).
5 BUREAU OF LABOR STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND LABOR STANDARDS ADMINIS-
TRATION, PUB No. 317, INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKERS COMPENSATION 3 (1969) [herein-
after INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS].
6 Friedman and Ladinsky, Social Change and the Lau, of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50,
72 (1967).
7 INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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workers' compensation system to the uncertain alternative costs of em-
ployer liability insurance or the spectre of increasingly successful em-
ployee negligence actions.8
The then "modem" idea central to the concept of workers' compen-
sation was that the cost of injuries, like wages and breakage of machinery,
was part of the costs of production. 9 In the long run, the consumer pub-
lic bore the costs. 10 Dean Pound stated that the twentieth century ac-
cepts the idea of insuring those unable to bear economic loss at the
expense of the nearest person at hand who can bear the loss, a concept
unacceptable to judges of the nineteenth century.I1
Workers' compensation statutes were seen as radical departures
from the common law tort system based on fault. The goal of the legisla-
tion was to provide compensation to the injured worker by direct pay-
ments under fixed rules without lawsuit or friction. 12 These benefits
were paid to the employee regardless of fault, and no proof of the em-
ployer's negligence was required.' 3 The goal of the system was to pro-
vide speedy and inexpensive relief to injured employees without resort to
litigation. 14 The workers' compensation laws, as remedial statutes, were
viewed as being entitled to broad and liberal interpretation. 15
Workers' compensation has been termed the oldest of the American
social insurance programs 16 and equivalent in its results to a species of
insurance in favor of workmen.' 7 This emphasis on the lack of fault of
either party and the spreading of the risk of loss among industry as a
whole and, ultimately, the consumer contrasts with the common law sys-
tem which preceded it. Workers' compensation in theory focused on in-
jury rather than negligence and on compensation rather than on
damages.' 8 Yet it was far from a complete shift in responsibility for risk
of loss since responsibility for funding the system still reposed, for the
most part, with private insurance companies.' 9
The central concept of causation in workers' compensation cases is
that a disability must result from the work relationship in order to be
compensable. Forty-two state workers' compensation statutes use the
phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" to describe the
8 D. GAGLIARDO, AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 389 (1955).
9 Honnold, Theoy of Workers Compensation, 3 CORNELL L. REV. 264, 268 (1918).
10 Nasha ffg. Co., 80 N.H. at 198, 115 A. at 452; Brodie, The Adequacy of ll'orhmen "s Compensation
as Social hisurance: A4 Review of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 57, 60.
11 Friedman and Ladinsky, s/pra note 6, at 74.
12 Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189, 193, 96 A. 287, 288 (1915).
13 Mitchell, supra note 1, at 352.
14 For an example of statutorily mandated liberal construction of workers' compensation, see
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3202 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160
Ga. 810, 129 S.E. 75 (1925).
15 See Continental Casualty Co. v. Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 181 S.E. 126 (1935); Sole v.
Kindelberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S.E. 151 (1922).
16 E. BURNS, THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 186 (1949).
17 ilaynie, 51 Ga. App at 652, 181 S.E. at 128; Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation and Other Social
Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 207, 210 (1965).
18 D. GAGLIARDO, supra note 8, at 384.
19 Professor Larson considers this fact signficant in distinguishing workers' compensation from a
true form of government-funded social insurance. According to Larson, the present American sys-
tem is neither tort nor socialism but something in between. A. LARSON, supra note 3. § 3.10, at 15.
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required causal connection between employment and disability. 20 These
two phrases together form a dual requirement of a connection between
the cause of a disability and a disability itself.2 1 The requirement that the
injury "arise out of the employment" is satisfied if the injury occurred as
a result of a risk to which the employee was exposed because of his or her
status as an employee by the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents
of employment.22 The "course of employment" portion of the test refers
to the time, place, and circumstances of the injury in relation to the em-
ployment.23 In theory, the workers' compensation schemes of the states
have rejected the proximate cause requirements of tort.24 Most courts
still require some relationship between work and disability greater than a
mere temporal relationship; that is, some increased risk of harm associ-
ated with the job in order to satisfy the "arise out of" test. This require-
ment that a disability "arise out of" the employment to some extent
rather than being a harm caused completely by the physical or psycho-
logical make-up of the employee has proven to be a fertile source of liti-
gation since the inception of workers' compensation. 25
The earliest American cases required the risk of physical injury to be
peculiar to the occupation of the injured worker. 26 Larson notes that the
peculiar risk test gradually disappeared in cases of physical injury.27 The
doctrine is alive and well, however, in the areas of occupational disease
28
and mental disability. 29 The rationale for requiring a risk of harm pecu-
liar to the occupation was to separate the occupational injury from that
20 Id. § 6.00, at 3-1.
"Arising out of" - words to bedevil the injured worker! A few judges gave lip-service to the
doctrine that it was their duty to construe the act liberally (to protect the rights of workers
who no longer could sue at common law and obtain ajury trial) and then used their ingenu-
ity to deny recovery. Others permitted recovery . . . liberally ....
S. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 93-94 (1944).
21 See Malone, The Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation-The Dual Requirement Reappraised,
51 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1973).
22 Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REV. 288, 296 (1964); Note, When
Stress Becomes Distress: Aental Disabilities under Workers' Compensation in Aassachusetts, 15 NEw ENG. 287,
291 (1980).
23 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 14.00, at 4-1.
24 Note, supra note 22, at 290. In practice, however, conservative interpretation of workers'
compensation statutes has resulted in the imposition of causal standards which are reminiscent of
the proximate cause requirements of tort.
25 "The interpretations of 'arising out of and in the scope of employment' are not uniform
among or even within the states but we believe it impossible to devise a tidy rule which will end the
controversies." THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMENS COMPENSATION
LAws 50 (1972). "[Ilt is enough if there be a causal connection between the injury and the business
... a connection substantially contributory though it need not be the sole proximate cause.... No
exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case." Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1923).
26 The legislature did not intend
to make the employer an insurer against all accident injuries which might happen to an
employee while in the course of his employement, but only for such injuries arising from or
growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work.... Risks to which all persons
similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the par-
ticular employment are excluded.
W. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 262 (1932).
27 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 6.20, at 3-4.
28 See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. REV. 916 (1980).
29 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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which might happen to any person, thus preventing the employer from
becoming a general insurer.30
The injustice of the application of this test to physical injuries is
readily apparent: an employee injured on the job should not be denied
workers' compensation if the injury causing disability such as a slip and
fall could have happened off-hours as readily as when the employee was
performing a work function. Yet this same test is still employed by many
courts in determining whether or not an occupational disease or mental
disability is work-related.
II. Evolution of the Definition of "Injury"
The reluctance of courts and legislatures to allow workers' compen-
sation benefits to claimants disabled by work-related stress recalls the re-
strictions once imposed on claimants disabled by physical injuries which
could not be attributed to a definite time and place. For many years, a
work injury in most states had to have been caused by a single, discrete
incident in order to be considered compensable. Disabling conditions
which resulted from gradual, repetitive trauma caused by the employee's
normal work duties were not considered as being within the ambit of
workers' compensation statutes. The majority of states have now come
to recognize either by amendment to the language of the statute or by
expansive judicial interpretation of the existing terminology that cumula-
tive occupational trauma resulting in disability is indeed compensable.
The early workers' compensation laws frequently imposed a require-
ment that the injury be "accidental." 3 1 To a great extent, the American
statutes were modeled after the English workers' compensation scheme
which provided that compensation should be paid in cases of "personal
injury by accident."'32 In other states, insistence on an accidential injury
was a judicially imposed requirement.33 For example, section 301(c) of
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act defined "injury by acci-
dent" as including "all other injuries sustained while the employe [sic] is
actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the em-
ployer... ,,24 While this definition would appear to encompass nonacci-
dental injuries, narrow judicial interpretation of this statutory definition
constituted ajudge-made obstruction to the operation of the Workmen's
Compensation statute.3 5 In Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co. ,36 the court
held that the death of a worker who contracted pneumonia after spend-
30 See In re McNichol, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N.E. 697, 697-98 (1913) where the court cited
English precedent for the proposition that the "arise out of" test excludes an injury which cannot be
fairly traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to
which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the business.
31 Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia use some form of the "accidental injury" for-
mulation. A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 37.10, at 7-1.
32 Fenton v. Thorley, House ofLords A.C. 443, 72 L.J. (K.B.) 787; 89 L.T. 314; 52 W.R. 81; 19
T.L.R. 684 (1903).
33 See Butler, The Compensability of a Physical hjniy as a Result of a Mental Stimuhs in lWorkers Compen-
sation-The Dark Ages in Ohio, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1983).
34 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1986).
35 Abrams, Pennsylvania Jlorkmans' Compensation: An Analysis of Persistent Problems and Recent Legisla-
tive Reforma, 76 DIcK. L. REV. 445 (1972).
36 309 Pa. 574, 164 A. 724 (1933).
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ing an hour in a refrigerated room was not an "accident" but was the
natural consequence of his entering and remaining in the refrigerated
room.
The workmen's compensation statute of Ohio adopted a similarly
expansive definition of injury in 1913.37 Early Ohio decisions, however,
construed this definition as requiring that a compensable injury be acci-
dental and traumatic in origin in order to be compensable.
38
Another judicially adopted requirement similar to the "accident" re-
quirement was the "wear and tear" doctrine of Massachusetts. The 1912
Massachusetts Workers' Compensation statute required only that the
personal injury for which compensation was sought be one arising "out
of and in the course of employment." Thus, no "accident" was re-
quired.39 The Massachusetts courts created their own "accident require-
ment" that physical disabilities resulting from "wear and tear" on the
body rather than a specific incident were not entitled to workers' com-
pensation benefits. 40 This doctrine was defined in 1917 as follows:
The act affords no relief against general disease. It is not a scheme for
health insurance. It deals only with personal injuries following as an
immediate result from the employment as its direct cause .... A dis-
ease of mind or body which arises in the course of employment, with
nothing more, is not within the act .... A person may exhaust his
physical or mental energies by exacting toil, and become unfit for fur-
ther service, but he is not because of this entitled to compensation, for
the reason that this condition cannot fairly be described as a personal
injury.
4 1
Thus, whether or not the early state statutes used the term "acci-
dent," many state courts imposed restrictive definitions of "injury" to
mean sudden, unexpected, incidents attributable to a specific time and
37 "Injury" is defined as "any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental
in character or result received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employ-
ment." OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1986). Section 1465.68 of the
Ohio Session Laws provided that "every employee who is injured wheresoever such injury has oc-
curred ... shall be entitled to receive ... such compensation for loss sustained on account of such
injury or disease." 103 Ohio Laws 79 (1913).
38 See, e.g., Courdray v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 173, 38 N.E.2d 1017 (1942); Goodman
v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 81, 19 N.E.2d 508 (1939); Industrial Comm'n v. Franken, 126
Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933); Renkel v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834
(1923); Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918). As the court stated in
Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 144 Ohio St. 22, 31, 56 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1944):
The statute does not expressly require the injury to be accidental. Neither is it ex-
pressly required therein that there be a causal connection between the injury and the em-
ployment. Yet there is the express provision that the injury must be received in the course
of and arise out of the scope of employment. This essential cannot exist without such
causal connection and, in turn, causal connection cannot exist unless the injury is accidental
in character and result.
See also Butler, supra note 33, at 5. While the requirement of accidental injury here was to distinguish
an injury from a disease, the Ohio decisions have continued to insist on an "accidental" injury as a
prerequisite for workers' compensation. See Bowman v. National Graphics Corp., 55 Ohio St. 2d
222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 (1978) where the claimant developed back pain as a result of a gradually
worsening condition caused by his employment. The court found the accident incompensable be-
cause there was no occurrence which was unforeseen, unexpected or unusual.
39 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 26 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987).
40 Note, supra note 22, at 297.
41 In re Maggelet, 228 Mass. 57, 61, 116 N.E. 972, 974 (1917).
[Vol. 62:879
STRESS CLAIMS
place. Excluded were physical injuries caused by gradual cumulative
trauma to the body, preexisting conditions aggravated by occupational
trauma, and occupational diseases.
42
There are several explanations for the conservatism which character-
ized the early American insistence on accidental injury. Little legislative
history exists from this period and it has been suggested that the Ameri-
can statutes simply adopted the requirements of the English statute,
including "injury by accident."'43 The English, however, quickly inter-
preted their statute as allowing compensation where disability ensued
following normal performance of a worker's job.44 The American courts,
in contrast, were reluctant to abandon the idea that an "accident" re-
quired an unusual or unexpected causal event as opposed to an unex-
pected result.
4 5
Critics suggest that workers' compensation was, at the time, viewed
as a pioneering social experiment which required cautious and conserva-
tive application to increase the likelihood of success.46 The predominant
argument was that a narrow definition of injury would keep controversy
to a minimum by limiting compensation to cases where causation was
obvious.
47
It is generally accepted that in many of the early cases, the courts
interpreted the injury requirement narrowly in order to distinguish com-
pensable workers' compensation injuries from noncompensable occupa-
tional diseases. 48 The reluctance of most courts to extend workers'
compensation coverage to injuries not traceable to a single isolated event
reflected a conservatism which contrasts markedly with their stated de-
sire to liberally construe workers' compensation statutes.49 This conser-
vatism appeared to stem from a fear that to adopt a broad definition of
injury would lead to large numbers of cases being found compensable,
thus resulting in great economic liability for employers. This is a theme
42 SeeJeffreyes v. Charles H. Sager Co., 198 A.D. 446, 191 N.Y.S. 354 (1921).
43 See Gradwohl, Workmen s Compensation: An Analysis of Nebraska s Revised "Accident" Requirement,
43 NEB. L. REV. 27 (1964); Jaskowiak, The Meaning of the Term "Accident" in the Indiana Workmen's
Compensation Act, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 534, 538 (1979).
44 Fenton v. Thorley, House of Lords A.C. 443; 72 LJ. (K.B.) 787; 89 L.T. 314; 52 W.R. 81; 19
T.L.R. 684 (1903) (claimant sustained a rupture while doing his ordinary work without sustaining a
blow or slip). See also G. THOMAS, LEADING CASES IN WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 3 (1913).
45 Brodie, supra note 10, at 65-66.
46 E. BURNS, sUpra note 16, at 186.
47 One of the earliest state workers' compensation schemes was struck down by a New York
court as violating the state's due process clause. Brodie, supra note 10, at 59.
48 See Industrial Comm'n v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 311-12, 110 N.E. 774, 745 (1915):
The premium rates assessed and collected by the administering board ... have been
fixed on a basis of death and injuries by accident solely, to the entire exclusion of injury
through disease. It is quite patent that any other construction would necessitate an immedi-
ate and striking horizontal elevation of all premium rates and would in all probability prove
a serious menace to the law itself.... To seriously cripple [the law] by a construction that
could readily be defended from a legal standpoint, and that would at the same time be held
to be the more humane interpretation, would in the long run work a great injury to the
industrial classes as a whole. An injustice would likewise be done to the employers of Ohio,
who alone are contributing the millions that go to make up the fund.
49 See, e.g., York v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 131 Pa. Super. 496, 499, 200 A. 230, 231 (1938)
where the court stated, "our compensation statutes contemplate liberality not only in the admission
of evidence but also in the inferences to be drawn therefrom"; and Continental Casualty Co. v.
Haynie, 51 Ga. App. 650, 652, 181 S.E. 126, 127-28 (1935).
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repeatedly found throughout the history of workers' compensation laws
in this country, and explains much of the judicial and statutory approach
to stress-related disability today.
Eventually, the courts of most jurisdictions began to expand the def-
inition of "injury by accident" to include disability caused by repetitive
physical trauma which was not unusual and disability caused partially but
not completely by occupational factors. Although this process took de-
cades of judicial interpretation, the American decisions eventually fol-
lowed those of Britain in holding that an injury is accidental where either
the cause or the result is accidental and unforeseen, although the work
being done is usual and ordinary. Gradually, an unexpected or unfore-
seen act was no longer required as a prerequisite to finding a disability
compensable. It was sufficient that the employee's disability was itself
unexpected, assuming that the injury resulted from employment. 50
Once courts crossed this conceptual hurdle, they soon concluded
that accidental injuries could be the result of cumulative physical injuries
which gradually brought about the claimant's disability. Such a view
comported with the liberal construction to be granted workers' compen-
sation statutes. 51 One may surmise that the courts were sufficiently com-
fortable with the concept of workers' compensation to warrant expansion
of its applicability to nonaccidental injury. In 1972, the National Com-
mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws concluded that the ac-
cident requirement had been largely discarded as barring compensation
for injuries which were clearly work-related. 52 A number of states have
removed the "accident" requirement from the wording of their workers'
compensation statutes and instead have adopted a broader term such as
"injury." 53 Other states have viewed work disabilities which have devel-
oped over a period of time as a series of minor accidents.
54
Most jurisdictions have now adopted expansive views of the defini-
tion of the word "injury" as applied to physical work injuries. Occupa-
tional injuries caused by cumulative routine physical exertion,
aggravation of preexisting conditions, and occupational factors as one of
50 See, e.g., Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S.W.2d 961 (1945); Garofola v.
Yale & Town Mfg. Co., 131 Conn. 572, 41 A.2d 45 (1945); Custer v. Higgins Indus., 24 So. 2d 511
(La. 1946); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Grimes, 186 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). See also,
Brodie, supra note 10, at 66; Horowitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of llorkmen "s Compensation, 12 L.
Soc'YJ. 465 (1947).
51 "[Tlhe word injury, when used without any qualifying words, such as traumatic, is to be given
its broadest possible scope .... [T]he legislature did not intend to limit injuries in the absence of a
disease to only those injuries of a traumatic nature." Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Ky.
1955). See Graves, Evolution of the "Accident" Requirement in l1'orkmen 's Compensation Practice, 59 Ky. L.J.
156, 158 (1970).
52 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 49 (1972).
53 See, e.g., Pennsylvania's Workman's Compensation Act of 1915, Pub. L. No. 736, which was
amended in 1971 to remove the accident requirement. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Purdon 1952 &
Supp. 1986).
54 See, e.g., Scanlon v. Bernard Lumber Co. Inc., 365 So. 2d 39 (La. Ct. App. 1978) where a series
of minor incidents produced disability of the back and the cumulative effect of the minor injuries was
held to satisfy the "accident" requirement of the workers' compensation statute. Hearing loss due to
exposure to 20 years of loud noise was held compensable where each outburst of noise was a minia-




several causative factors contributing to disability have routinely been
found to be injuries within the meaning of state workers' compensation
acts. Gradual injuries caused by employment have been held compensa-
ble 55 as have major or minor work injuries which have activated underly-
ing nonwork related injuries or diseases.
56
Under the expansive view now generally accorded physical injuries,
the occupational factors do not have to be the sole cause of a disability in
order for it to be compensable. 57 Several jurisdictions which formerly
insisted on unusual stress or strain as a prerequisite for finding a physical
injury have recently adopted the more modem view.58 This trend is not
applicable to all workers' compensation injuries, however. The evolution
of the definition of injury has been far less pronounced in heart injury
cases and the older definitions of the accident requirement have shown a
definite revival in cases of disability caused by nonphysical work stress. 59
Disabilities resulting from heart problems caused by or aggravated
by occupational factors have been particularly troubling to the courts.
While the majority ofjurisdictions now reject the "unusual exertion" test
in heart cases, 60 a significant number of states retain the older standard
which typically requires that a claimant prove either that the heart attack
was caused by unusual occupational exertion or was caused by stress or
strain greater than that experienced in normal life.61 The courts are far
more likely to require these threshold requirements in cases involving
heart conditions where the causal connection to employment is not obvi-
ous. It is particularly interesting to note that in two of these states, the
''unusual stress" standard in heart cases was judicially promulgated in
the face of a history of liberal interpretation of the accidental injury re-
quirement. In Missouri, the term "accident" was originally construed as
including injuries incurred in the usual and routine performance of an
55 See, e.g., Williams v. ARA Envtl. Servs., Inc., 334 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Downes v.
IBP, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 39, 691 P.2d 42 (1984); General Elec. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill.
App. 3d 352, 359, 472 N.E.2d 486, 491 (1984) ("[T]here need be no external violence to the body
... and compensation may be allowed where one's existing physical structure, whatever it may be,
gives way under stress of one's usual labor."); Village v. General Motors Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 129,
472 N.E.2d 1079 (1984). But see Kraft Dairy Group v. Bernardini, 329 S.E.2d 46 (Va. 1985) (chronic
muscular ligamentous strain resulting from repetitive heavy lifting not injury by accident); Poe v.
Acme Buildings, 154 N.C. App. 147, 316 S.E.2d 388 (1958).
56 See, e.g., Harris v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 334, 678 P.2d 178 (1984) (When a
worker with a preexisting condition is accepted for employment and a subsequent industrial injury
aggravates, accelerates or intensifies his condition resulting in disability, he is entitled to compensa-
tion); Mulder v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 361 N.W.2d 572, 576 (Minn. 1978) ("[T]he plain-
tiff was predisposed to develop such a condition, and the same injury to another person might not
have resulted in a similar disabilty. But that is no defense. Where an accident combines with a
preexisting condition to produce disability, the injured workman may recover compensation.");
Starcher v. Chrysler Corp., 15 Ohio App. 3d 57, 472 N.E.2d 736 (1984) (aggravation need not be
substantial).
57 See Coddington v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 681 P.2d 799 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
58 See, e.g., Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1983); Village v.
General Motors Corp., 15 Ohio St. 3d 129, 472 N.E.2d 1079 (1984).
59 Jaskowiak, supra note 43, at 547.
60 The majority ofjurisdictions that now accept the "usual exertion" test in heart cases is three
to one over those that reject it. A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 38.31 (a), at 7-56.
61 Larson cites the workers' compensation statutes of New York, Nebraska, Illinois and Arkansas
as codifying this standard. A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 38.31(c), at 7-109 to 7-110.
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employee's duties. 62 It was not until 1941 that the Missouri Supreme
Court judicially constricted the definition of accident to require a finding
of abnormal or unusual strain. 63 In that case the worker sought compen-
sation for a coronary sustained while carrying a forty-five pound weight.
The court denied compensation because he frequently carried such
weights. A similar development occurred in Nebraska where a liberal in-
terpretation of the term "accident" was employed during the first twenty
years of the workers' compensation statute. It was not until being called
upon to decide a claim for benefits where the disabled worker alleged
that his employment had caused his heart problem that the Nebraska ju-
diciary required an event more strenuous than that ordinarily incident to
employment as a predicate for compensable disability. 64 In early cases in
Indiana, the courts adopted a liberal standard that a victim's injury need
only be unexpected for it to be considered an "accident" within the
meaning of the workmen's compensation statute. They adopted a more
restrictive view of the term "accident," however, in a case involving a
worker's death from coronary occlusion while performing his normal
physical work. 65
Thus, these courts chose to impose new requirements on their work-
ers' compensation statutes when faced with the spectre of allowing com-
pensation for medical conditions not obviously related to employment.
Rather than allow the trier of fact to make reasoned decisions on the
basis of the expert and lay testimony presented, the courts chose to limit
the scope of the statutes. They apparently feared that the legal system
could not rely on medical evidence to properly differentiate between
work-related and nonwork-related stress.66
The "unusual stress" test is far from moribund in heart cases. 67
Although, as noted, the test is the minority rule, it is indicative of the
concerns expressed by courts who wish to prevent workers' compensa-
tion statutes from being too widely applied. The purpose of the rule,
and the purpose of the accidental injury requirement, is to provide some
indicia of reliability to the ensuing disability. The courts, accustomed to
negligence causes of action in tort which required physical impact to the
body, applied the impact rule to workers' compensation as well. This
62 See Carr v. Murch Bros. Constr. Co., 223 Mo. App. 788, 792, 21 S.W.2d 897, 899 (1929);
Drecksmith v. Universal Car Loading and Distrib. Co., 18 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929). See
also Comment, Statutory "Accident" Requirement for Missouri Iorkers Compensation Judicially Repealed, 49
Mo. L. REv. 664 (1984).
63 State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co., 348 Mo. 319, 326, 153 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1941).
64 Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d 236 (1963); Green v. Benson
Transfer Co., 173 Neb. 226, 113 N.W.2d 61 (1962). See also Gradwohl, supra note 43.
65 United States Steel Co. v. Dykes, 238 Ind. 59, 154 N.E.2d 11 (1958). See also Jaskowiak, supra
note 43, at 541.
66 See, e.g., Dykes, 238 Ind. 59, 154 N.E.2d 11, where the court explicitly expressed its concern
with the problem of establishing a causal connection between heart attacks and work in view of the
doctor's inability to evaluate the significance of a particular occupational stress as compared with
nonoccupational stress.
67 See, e.g., Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 13 Ark. App. 199, 681 S.W.2d 419 (1985); In re Hen-
dricks, 676 P.2d 1220 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); City ofOpa Locka v. Quinlan, 451 So. 2d 965 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1985); Ganske v. North Dakota Work-
men's Compensation Bureau, 355 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1984); Brown v. LaFrance Indus., 286 S.C. 319,
333 S.E.2d 348 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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occurred even though the avowed purpose of workers' compensation was
to provide a quick source of income to injured workers free of the strict
requirements of tort.68 The purpose of the impact rule of tort was to
prevent spurious claims. 69 Tort law has moved away from requiring
physical impact as a prerequisite for recovery for emotional distress.
70
While the definition of "injury" or "accidental injury" in workers' com-
pensation law has undergone a corresponding liberalization, the courts
bear a lingering distrust of claims for emotional injury and are still far
more likely to retain or revive the older forms of analysis in such cases.
III. Occupational Disease
The earliest workers' compensation statutes did not provide for the
compensation of occupational diseases. 71 Some experts suggest that this
reflected the then-current state of medical knowledge which was ill-in-
formed of the existence of such diseases and their etiology. 72 This is
probably specious; knowledge of the connection between industrial dis-
ease and certain occupations had been observed since the time of the
Renaissance. 73 It is true, however, that state workers' compensation stat-
utes tended to follow the model of the English workers' compensation
statute which did not at first provide for compensability of disease.
74
The use of the word "accident" showed legislative intent that occupa-
tional disease was not to be included. 75 The English statute was quickly
amended to include occupational disease. 76 However, it was many years
before the majority of states followed suit.7 7 In fact, some states ex-
pressly prohibited the compensation of occupational disease, or limited
compensation to those cases where disease followed a physical injury.
78
The "accident" requirement of most early workers' compensation stat-
utes proved to be a conceptual barrier to the acceptance of occupational
disease. A disease by definition is not sudden or immediate and cannot
68 Manson, supra note 2, at 376.
69 See Kentucky Traction and Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 292, 23 S.W.2d
272, 275 (1929) (contact, however slight, demonstrates the validity of the claim); Mitchell v. Roches-
ter Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896). See also Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress: Fonnulating the Psycho-Legal Inguiry, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 401, 403 (1984).
70 Podlewski, Recovery for Nervous hIjury Resultingfrom Mental Stimulus under W'orkmen 's Compensation
Laws, 53 CHI[-]KENrr L. REV. 730, 731 (1977).
71 "The general rule is that an occupational disease is not compensable under workman's com-
pensation statutes." BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, No. 379 (1925).
See Texas Employers Ass'n v. Barron, 21 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). See also Recent Deci-
sions, Lead Poisoning Contracted by an Auto Mechanic not an Occupational Disease-Cancer Contracted by Bat-
tery Plant Employee an Occupational Disease, 37 MICH. L. REv. 829, 830 (1939).
72 Available medical knowledge and industrial hygiene was limited in 1911. French, Occupational
Disease Legislation in California, 19 AM. LAB. LEG. REV. 338 (1929).
73 See W. MORGAN & A. SEATON, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES 1-3 (1975).
74 See Eke v. Hart-Dyke, 2 K.B. 677, 80 LJ. (K-B) 90; 103 L.T. 174; 26 T.L.R. 613 (1910).
75 Beers, Compensation for Occupational Disease, 37 YALE LJ. 579, 583-84 (1928).
76 The English statute included occupational disease by 1906; none of the early American stat-
utes did. Brodie, supra note 10, at 61.
77 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.20, at 7-358.
78 For example, North Carolina's 1929 Workmen's Compensation statute explicitly rejected oc-
cupational disease except where resulting from an accident. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(6) (1985). See
also Note, The Iowa Occupational Disease Law, 34 IowA L. REV. 510, 512 (1949); Note, [orkmnen's Com-
pensation Development of North Carolina Occupational Disease, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1971).
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in most cases be attributed to a single exposure or incident. 79 If a dis-
ease could perchance be traced to a single event, it could be declared
accidental and thus compensable. 80 It was the rare disease that could be
isolated to a particular exposure, the result being that few occupational
diseases were compensated. The fact that this held true even after the
corresponding liberalization in the "accident" definition as applied to in-
juries8' leads to the conclusion that legislatures and courts were hostile
to the concept of compensating occupational disease. It was apparent to
many contemporary commentators that there was no logic in allowing
compensation for injury while denying it for disease. 82 As one court rea-
soned, it was illogical to deny compensation to a man blinded by fumes
and yet grant it to a man blinded by a blow. 83 This distinction was criti-
cal because in many states a worker would have difficulty winning a tort
action against an employer for a work-related occupational disease. Re-
covery at common law in most states was based on the failure of the em-
ployer to warn or to provide a safe place to work.8 4 Many courts denied
liability based on the rationale that a safe place to work did not mean a
sanitary place. These decisions also noted that occupational diseases
were unknown to the common law.85 Thus, employees were deprived of
compensation for work related occupational disease through workers'
compensation or tort.
The state legislatures eventually considered three alternative
schemes for compensating occupational diseases. The first of these, fol-
lowing the lead of California and Massachusetts,8 6 was simply to provide
for the consideration of occupational diseases as injuries. The most sig-
nificant objection to this controversial alternative was the often ex-
79 Note, H'orkmen's Compensation Acts-Occupational Disease as an Accidental Injury, 18 B.U.L. REV.
256, 258 (1938). If an injury develops gradually from conditions in occupation it is a disease and not
compensable. Carroll v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Colo. 473, 195 P. 1097 (1921). See also
Scheunemann, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 67 (1938). If the conditions from which an injury arises
are normally and constantly present it is an occupational disease. Industrial Comm'n v. Ule, 97 Colo.
253, 48 P.2d 803 (1935). If the conditions were unusual and unexpected, then it is an injury. Indus-
trial Comm'n v. Swanson, 93 Colo. 354, 26 P.2d 107 (1933).
80 One decision considered a disease to be accidental where there was specific exposure to paint
which resulted in septicemia. Lockard v. State Compensation Comm'n, 115 Va. 144, 174 S.E. 790
(1934). See W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS § 927, at 500 (1943).
81 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
82 One early authority called this "unjust and illogical." H. BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW 7 (1914).
83 See In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 226, 104 N.E. 336, 338-339 (1914), where an acute attack of
optic neuritis induced by poisonous coal tar gases was held to be compensable under the Massachu-
setts Workers' Compensation statute. The statute had a "no accident" requirement. Massachusetts
and California were two of the first states to permit compensation of occupational diseases. See
Beers, supra note 75, at 584; Note, Workmen 's Compensation Diseases Arising Out of Emploment-A Problem
of Proof, 2 PAC. L.J. 678 (1971).
84 See, e.g.,Jacque v. Locke Insulator Corp., 70 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1934);Jallico Coal Co. v. Ad-
kins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923). See also Comment, Indiana ll'orkmen 's Occupational Disease Act:
Silicosis, 14 IND. L.J. 542, 543 (1939).
85 See, e.g., McCreery v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 363 Ill. 321, 2 N.E.2d 290 (1936). For a
discussion of problems associated with such common law actions, see Comment, Workmen 's Conipensa-
tion for Dust Diseases, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 1142 (1936).
86 The California statute was amended in 1918 to include "any injury" arising out of and in the
scope of employment. 1917 Cal. Stat. c. 586, §§ 1-74. See Note, supra note 83, at 683. In Massachu-
setts, which had a no "accident" requirement, occupational diseases were declared compensable in
tturle, 217 Mass. at 226, 104 N.E. at 338. See also In re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379 (1916).
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pressed fear that such a scheme would allow for the compensation of
diseases which were feared to be as likely to occur from a nonindustrial
source as from the workplace.8 7 The concern was that this would render
the employer responsible for "mere" aggravations of preexisting dis-
eases. Difficulties in proving the source of such diseases would make the
employer responsible for the off-hours conduct, constitution, and lack of
health care of the worker, thus causing confusion as to whether diseases
were strictly occupational or due to a combination of factors.88 Critics
feared that the treatment of occupational disease on the same footing as
injuries would be tantamount to general social insurance.
8 9
Even today, the fear of compensating diseases which are not peculiar
to employment continues to be an underlying theme of occupational dis-
ease workers' compensation statutes. Most state laws have some type of
statutory prohibition against compensating ordinary diseases of life,
either explicit 9° or, as an adjunct to a definition of hazard or risk.91
This reluctance to adopt a general definition of occupational disease
results in part from concerns over lack of proof of job relatedness.
92
Equally important, however, is the perception that it would be unfair,
unwise, or expensive to allow compensation for diseases that the em-
ployee could just as easily have contracted outside of work. While to
some extent the states are concerned about fraudulent claims,93 there is
also a concern that a liberal definition of occupational disease would per-
mit a disabled worker to collect workers' compensation benefits regard-
less of whether the employment relationship had placed the worker at a
greater risk of contracting the disease. It is accepted as a given principle
that employment must present a greater risk of contracting a disease to
an employee in order for the disease to be considered occupational and
therefore compensable. 94 This has been termed "trade risk" 95 or "posi-
87 Many diseases can arise either from an industrial condition or from an ordinary source and it
may be very difficult to determine which is the causal factor. The Iowa Occupational Disease Law, supra
note 78, at 518.
88 See Harmon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 287-88, 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1948);
Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 2 N.E.2d 311 (1938); Sherman, Compensation for Indus-
trial Disease, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 514 (1917).
89 Adoption of a broad occupational disease plan would be a form of health insurance. Com-
ment, supra note 84. "Employees looked with apprehension upon a system which in effect furnished
a form of insurance. The same consideration has manifested itself in the case of every enlargement
of the compensation principle." Beers, supra note 75, at 580. See also Comment, Occupational Disease
Legislation in Pennsylvania, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 387 (1938).
90 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1981 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(a) (1983);
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (1950 & Supp. 1986).
91 The Washington statute, like those of many states, defined an occupational disease as arising
out of employment where it does not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been
equally exposed outside of employment. 1941 Wash. Laws tit. 50, § 7679-1 (Supp. 1941) (repealed
1961).
92 See Beers, Compensation for Occuational Diseases, 7 TENN. L. REV. 19 (1929). Only a few states
expressly extended the definition to cover occupational diseases as broadly as it covers injuries by
accident. The reason for this is obvious. There is such difficulty and uncertainty tracing causal
connection between the hazards of work and disease that the states have hesitated to carry the com-
pensation principle to its logical conclusion.
93 See Note, supra note 79, at 264.
94 See Le Lenko v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A.2d 253 (1942).
It is well established in this state that compensation is not due merely for injury caused by
disease contracted while employed . . . the employee's risk of contracting the disease by
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tional risk." 96
Professor Larson has offered explanations for the development of
theories of risk in workers' compensation. 97 The earliest theory was the
peculiar risk doctrine, which required the claimant to show that the
source of disability was in its nature peculiar to his occupation. 98 Thus, if
a worker was exposed to the same factors both in and out of work, no
matter how disparate the amount, the claim would be denied. This doc-
trine gave way to the increased risk test which "differs from the peculiar
risk test in that the distinctiveness of the employment risk can be contrib-
uted by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not peculiar to
employment." 99 More defensible, according to Larson, is the succeeding
test of actual risk which only looks to whether or not the employment did
create a risk of the harm. The majority of states follow the increased risk
test, but a growing number ofjurisdictions accept the positional risk doc-
trine which looks to whether the employment placed the employee in a
position to be injured by a "neutral" risk unconnected with the employ-
ment or with the employee.100 Thus, a disability does not "arise out of"
the scope of employment unless it satisfies one of these tests. The pecu-
liar risk test is currently more common in occupational disease statutes
than in those involving physical injuries.
While a minority of states have adopted a general definition of occu-
pational disease as an injury, the majority initially followed the lead of
the English statutes and allowed occupational disease compensation for a
specified list of diseases which were closely connected with particular oc-
cupations. 10 The Uniform State Law Commission in 1916 proposed a
list of occupational diseases, as opposed to ordinary diseases, to be com-
pensated. This was supported by "all well-considered precedents and by
practically all expert European opinion."'
0 2
Occupational disease compensation was limited to those diseases
which were strictly occupational in nature. This was viewed as removing
many questions of causation and helping avoid fraudulent claims and the
feared slide towards general health insurance for employees.' 0 3 The
virtue of the employment must be materially greater than the general public, i.e., the injury
must be a natural or probable result of the employment or conditions thereof.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 21 Cal. 2d 742, 744, 135 P.2d 153, 154 (1943).
See also Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938).
95 Sherman, supra note 88, at 514.
96 Note, 1l'orkmen "s Compensation-Occupational Disease Coverage in Mississippi, 40 Miss. L.J. 439, 443
(1969).
97 Larson, The Positional-Risk Doctrine in l'orkmen's Compensation, 1973 DUKE LJ. 761.
98 Id. at 763.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 761.
101 See Chojnacki, Occupational Disease Under the New York Workmen's Contpensation Law, 42 ST. JoHN's
L.. REv. 473, 491 (1968).
102 Sherman, supra note 88, at 522-23.
103 The Iowa Occupational Disease Law, supra note 78, at 517. It is interesting to note that the adop-
tion of the "list" style of occupational disease statutes came at a time when some sectors of society
were urging the adoption of general health insurance for all disease. The Federation of Labor in
New York favored such insurance because it was afraid that it would be difficult to prove that occupa-
tional disease was caused by employment, thus resulting in few awards. Employers threw their sup-
port behind limited "list" occupational disease workers' compensation plans to avoid such
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states which adopted the "list" type of statute followed two forms: The
statute either listed both the disease and the process of industry which
caused it, or it listed the disease alone. Either way, this method of pro-
viding for occupational disease limited the number of claims to which
employers were subject. The fact that the resulting limitation on the
ight of workers to be compensated caused great hardship did not appear
to concern lawmakers. As one commentator wrote in 1917:
If the problem of compensating for occupational diseases were
one of reparation for wrongs, justice might require the provision of a
legal remedy covering all possible cases, regardless of the difficulties
in the way of defining the conditions to liability and of tracing the
chain of causation. But no wrongs are involved ....
What are the maladies, if any, that are so certainly, demonstrably
and largely due to special health hazards of occupations that it would
be both just and expedient to reverse the natural law, which lets the
loss from the risks of life rest upon the victims, and instead to require
employers to assume the loss therefrom-or some high proportion of
such loss. Apparently, there are very few such maladies. 10 4
A major justification for the limited listing of occupational diseases
was economic. Some feared that the imposition of workers' compensa-
tion liability would seriously endanger the financial viability of certain
industries where occupational disease was widespread. Thus, twenty
states excluded known occupational diseases due to inhalation of differ-
ent types of dust in order to avoid the potentially serious financial
repercussions. 1
05
The primary purpose for adopting the schedule-type occupational
disease legislation was to limit the responsibility of the system for such
disabilities. 10 6 This goal has been fulfilled. Only five percent of those
disabled from work-related occupational diseases currently receive work-
ers' compensation benefits.' 0
7
Some states now have a hybrid occupational disease statute with
insurance. Andrews, Limitations of Occupational Disease Compensation, 8 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 311
(1918).
104 Sherman, supra note 88, at 525.
105 Larson, Occupational Disease Under Workman's Compensation Laws, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 87, 110
(1974). Other objections raised to occupational disease legislation were: The fear of economic dis-
advantage with states not requiring such compensation; (Ferguson, Pneumoconiosis and the Social Effects,
5 INDUS. MED. 31 (1936); Comment, supra note 85, at 1154); the fear that occupational disease legis-
lation would make employers reluctant to hire persons of bad health (The Iowa Occupational Disease
Law, supra note 78, at 518); a belief that the employee was at fault for failing to compel his employer
to remedy the hazard; that the increasing responsibility of the employer for the health of the em-
ployee would increase employee irresponsibility (Comment, supra note 89, at 387); that requiring the
employer to be responsible for the old age, disability unemployment on death of the employee
would result in the loss of industry (Angerstein, New Illinois Occupational DiseaseAct, 3J. MAR. 116, 117
(1937)); that providing relief for occupational disease under ordinary Workers' Compensation Acts
would open the door to highly litigious claims (Checkver, Suggested Analysis for Treating Disease as Per-
sonal htjuay by Accident Under Workmen 's Compensation Acts, 14 U. VA. L. REV. 358, 361 (1928)); and, that
it would be difficult to apportion responsibility between successive employers (Chamberlain, Work-
men s Compensation for Disease Due to Employment, 10 A.B.A. J. 647 (1924)).
106 Special skill engineered the construction of these schedules so as to limit benefits to a mini-
mum of cases and to types of diseases where disability would run relatively low. Wilcox, The 'Sched-
ule" Fraud in Occupational Disease Compensation, 24 AMER. LAB. LEG. REv. 120 (1934).
107 U.S. Department of Labor, An Inteim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease, at 5 (1980).
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both a schedule of diseases and a "catch-all" provision providing for in-
creased recognition of nonlisted occupational disease. 10 8 The trend has
been towards a broadening of statutory disease coverage' 0 9 yet a minor-
ity of states treat occupational disease on the same basis as traumatic
injury, i.e., requiring only that the disease arise out of and in the scope of
employment.11 0 Most states, even those with a general definition of oc-
cupational disease, retain a requirement that the disease be peculiar to or
characteristic of the occupation and not a disease of ordinary life, or exist
as a hazard in numerical terms more common to the occupation than to
the general public. 1 I
The fears expressed by proponents of the schedule type of occupa-
tional disease statutes have not been realized.' 1 2 Some suggest that in-
surers themselves are in favor of expanding coverage of occupational
disease. This circumvents possible common law actions against employ-
ers based on occupational diseases not covered (and thus not barred
from common law tort actions) by workers' compensation." 13
The fact that even the most generally defined occupational disease
legislation still restricts occupational disease by utilizing a type of pecu-
liar risk test means that many occupational diseases are not being com-
pensated. Many occupational diseases are not easily distinguished from
"ordinary diseases of life."'' 4 Restrictions which require occupational
diseases to be peculiar to or characteristic of an occupation, when cou-
pled with statutes of limitations and presumptions against compensation
in the absence of specified hazard exposure, compound the barriers to
compensation imposed by inherent medical complexities." 15
The inescapable conclusion is that the majority of states are still un-
willing to treat occupational diseases in the manner that workers' com-
pensation treats physical injuries-by allowing the administrative trier of
fact to determine whether or not a given disability arises out of and in the
course of employment. By requiring that diseases be shown to be pecu-
108 Morgis, Beauregard & Shaub, State Compensatory Provisions for Occupational Disease, United States
Department of the Interior, Bulletin 623, Bureau of Mines (1967). An example of the catch-all type
of workers' compensation occupational disease statute is that of New York which lists 28 diseases
together with a 29th category providing for "any and all occupational diseases" resulting from any
and all employments. N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAw § 3(2) (McKinney 1965).
109 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 41.31, at 7-361 to 7-362.
110 See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265 (1984); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3708 (West 1971 & Supp.
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2301 (1974).
111 Note that this requirement was long ago abandoned in physical injury cases.
[I]t may not be peculiar to working in a factory that an employee slips on a well-kept floor.
He may more easily slip in his wife's slovenly kept kitchen. Yet if, perchance, he trips or
slips on the factory floor, nearly every state in the Union gives him an award.... Peculiar to
the work and not common to the neighborhood-a mere doggerel to deny liability. Aside
from industrial diseases, many modern injuries are really not peculiar to an employee's
work, they may happen anywhere.
S. HoRoVrz, snpra note 20, at 103, 104 (quoting In re Rozeh, 294 Mass. 205, 200 N.E. 903 (1936)).
112 After 17 years experience, Wisconsin, a full coverage state, reported that dubious cases and
malingering were manageable. H. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 51 (1954).
113 "Administration of Occupational Disease Provisions", International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions, Proceedings 1952, U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Bull. 167, 93-
123, cited in H. SOMMERS, supra note 112, at 68.
114 H. SOMMERS, supra note 112, at 68.
115 Id. at 68-69.
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liar to an occupation, the legislative bodies are displaying distrust of the
very mechanisms set up to adjudicate the work-related nature of disabil-
ity. While some may argue that a broad definition of occupational dis-
ease would result in the compensation of diseases whose causal
connection to employment is tenuous, 1 6 it is questionable whether it is
preferable to require public insurance schemes such as social security
and private insurance plans to pay for disability from occupational dis-
ease which in fact results from occupational exposure.' 1 7
IV. Psychic Injury
In the past two decades the number of stress-related mental disabil-
ity workers' compensation cases has increased markedly." I 8 The reason
for this is unknown. Experts suggest that high unemployment and plant
closings could be increasing stress in the workplace, or that an increase
in recognition by all areas of law that mental disability may be as com-
pensable as physical disability has lead to greater awareness of these
claims. 119
Court decisions and commentators alike accept Professor Larson's
classification of workers' compensation cases involving mental injuries:
(1) physical trauma which produces a mental disorder; (2) mental stimu-
lus which produces a physical disability; and (3) mental stimulus which
produces a mental disorder. 120
116 LaDov, Mulryen & McCarthy, Cumulative Injury or Disease Claims: An Attempt to Define Employers
Liability for Workers Compensation, 6 AM. J. L. & MED. 3 (1980).
117 The major sources of income support for those severely disabled from an occupational
disease are: social security (53 percent), pensions (21 percent), veterans benefits (17 per-
cent), welfare (16 percent), workers' compensation (5 percent), and private insurance (1
percent).... Among those severely disabled from an occupational disease, one out of every
four receive no income support payments. One in every three receive multiple benefits.
An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease, supra note 107, at 2-3.
118 See DeCarlo, Compensating "Stress" in the '80"s, INs. COUNSELJ. 681 (Oct. 1985).
119 Id. at 683. More research is needed in this area. It has been suggested that the volume of
workers' compensation cases increases in poor economic times. See Otjen, The Legal History of the
Occupational Disease Law in Wisconsin, 22 MARQ. L. REV. 113, 123-24 (1938). Whether that holds true
with mental disability claims as well or whether the increase in such claims reflects a change in the
demographic make-up of the workforce is unknown. A 1983 study by the California Workers' Com-
pensation Institute indicated that during 1980-82, stress claims more than doubled, while all other
disability work injuries decreased 11% during the same period. The National Council on Compen-
sation Insurance reported that 59% of gradual mental stress claimants were age 39 or less whereas
40% of other occupational disease claimants were younger than 40. Females accounted for more
than one-half the gradual mental stress claims. It is unknown whether this study looked only at
occupational disease claims. National Council on Compensation Insurance, EMOTIONAL S'RESS IN
THE WORKPLACE-NEw LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE EIGHIES 5 (1985) [hereinafter NEW LEGAL RIGHTS IN
THE EIGHTIES].
120 See, e.g., Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 111. 2d 556, 564-65, 343 N.E.2d 913, 917-18
(1976); Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1016-17 (Me. 1979); Deziel v.
Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403 Mich. 1, 22, 268 N.W.2d 1, 9 (1978); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 509, 330 N.E.2d 603, 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640 (1975); A. LARSON, supra note
3, §§ 42.00-42.23, at 7-575 to 7-679; Christensen, Psychological Injury in ll'orkers* Compensation, 16 GA.
S.BJ. 18 (1970); Joseph, The Causation Issue in ll'orkers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: An Analysis,
Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 287 (1983); Podlewski, supra note 70, at 734;
Render, Mental Illness as an Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L. REV. 288 (1964); Comment, ll'orkmen:s
Compensation: Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 472, 475 (1976-77); Com-
ment, Georgia's Mental Block in Workers" Compensation, 36 MERCER L. REV. 971, 973 (1985); Comment,
,1Iental Disability Resultingfrom Series of Stressful Work-Related Incidents is Compensable-Albanese's Case,
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The first of these categories-physical trauma producing a mental
disability-is accepted by most states as compensable. This rule was es-
tablished as early as in the 1920s when the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
found that "neurasthenia" resulting from a physical injury arising out of
and in the course of employment was compensable.' 2 1
More difficult is the second category of cases where there is no phys-
ical injury at all but rather mental stress or strain which produces a physi-
cal injury such as a stroke or heart attack. 122 Courts have uniformly
found compensability in situations where physical injuries are caused by
mental stimulus. 12
3
Most courts, in deciding cases which fit into the second category,
agree with the rationale stated in Insurance Department of Mississippi v. Dins-
more: "It seems unthinkable that, if hypertension may be aggravated
either by physical or mental and emotional exertion, courts should be
willing to accept the physical causative, but reject, as not accidental, a
disability proximately resulting from mental and emotional exertion."'
24
This reasoning closely parallels that used earlier in the century to agitate
for compensation of occupational disease.
Where the work-related stress is relatively brief and occurs within a
limited period of time, resulting physical injuries are likely to be held
compensable. 25 The courts are far more likely, however, to deny com-
pensation where the work-related stress causing a physical injury is more
protracted, either on the grounds that there was no "injury by acci-
dent"'126 or that the strain causing the injury is no greater than that ex-
perienced by all persons generally.
The reluctance displayed by those courts faced with the prospect of
compensating physical injuries such as heart attacks can also be seen
when examining the compensation of mental injuries caused by work-
related stress. While a majority ofjurisdictions now allow compensation
of mental-mental claims, 127 these claims are not accepted without reser-
vation. Most courts have been reluctant to treat mental injuries on the
14 SUFFOLK L. REV. 174, 177 (1980); Comment, Workers' Compensation and Gradual Stress in the Work-
place, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1985).
121 See Rialto Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 112 Okla. 101, 240 P. 96 (1925). See also
the extensive list of cases cited by A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.22(a) n.68, at 7-602.
122 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.2 1(a), at 7-586.
123 See A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.21(a), at 7-586; Comment, Compensability of Mental Injuiy:
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 21 N.Y. L. FORUM 465, 470 (1976); Comment, Aental Disability
Resulting From Series of Stressful Work-Related Incidents is Compensable-Albanese's Case, 14 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 174, 177 (1980). This opinion is not shared by all courts. See, e.g., King v. Wilson Bros. Drilling
Co., Inc., 441 So. 2d 68, 71 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (denied compensation for an occupational stress-
related heart attack because the stress was "not of a degree greater than that generated in every day
non-employment"). See also Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953) (Com-
pensation denied for cerebral hemorrhage caused by anxiety over a police investigation of a fatal car
accident occuring within the scope of employment; the court concluded that anxiety and worry do
not constitute an injury.) (overruled in Ryan v. Conner, 28 Ohio St. 3d 406, 503 N.E.2d 1379
(1986)).
124 233 Miss. 569, 572, 102 So. 2d 691, 694 (1958).
125 See, e.g., Cabe v. Union Carbide Corp., 644 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1983).
126 See A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.21(d), at 7-597. This proposition was inelegantly phrased by
the court in Russell v. Department of Corrections, 464 So. 2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. 1984): "Plaintiff
suffered no job-related mental stress greater than that involved in everyday nonemployment life."
127 Workers' Compensation Monthly, 27 (July 1986).
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same basis as physical injuries because of the belief that such disabilities
require a more cautious approach. 28 The majority of jurisdictions have
developed, by decision or statute, threshold barriers to such claims.
These barriers resemble the cautious positions taken during the earliest
days of workers' compensation. The language of many decisions in this
area show that the courts have revived the concerns which originally sur-
faced when questions of expanding the definition of physical injury and
compensating occupational disease first arose. These concerns are
voiced both in decisions accepting and decisions rejecting mental-mental
claims. The courts, which once again fear turning workers' compensa-
tion into general health insurance, 29 are concerned that a liberal stan-
dard would "open the floodgates" to numerous, perhaps fraudulent,
claims of mental injury,130 and are concerned that they cannot effectively
evaluate claims of mental injury.
13 1
These reservations are frequently couched in terms that a stress re-
lated mental injury did not "arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment."' 3 2  This serves as a convenient way in which to deny
128 See, e.g., Seitz v. L & R Indus., Inc., 437 A.2d 1345 (R.I. 1981); Graves v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 713 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 1986) (compensation denied to claimant suffering from non-traumatic
mental injury due to lack of special employment stress of a greater magnitude than day-to-day stress
usually experienced).
129 See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 119 Ariz. 51, 55, 579 P.2d 555, 559
(1978) (Gordon, J., dissenting) ("Although the Workmen's Compensaton Act should be liberally
construed to meet its intended purpose, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Act was not
intended to be a general health and accident substitute.... Today's approval of the award for a
mental condition brought about by the gradual build-up of emotional stress over a period of time,
without an injury-causing event, paves the way for tomorrow's abuses of the workmen's compensa-
tion system."); Lockwood v. Independent School Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Minn. 1981)
(mental injury caused byjob-related stress without physical trauma not compensable); Williams v.
Western Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 585, 429 A.2d 1063 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (com-
pensation denied; claimant failed to show by objective evidence rather than subjective reactions, that
assembly line work materially contributed to disability). See also Bentley v. Associated Spring Co.,
133 Mich. App. 15, 347 N.W.2d 784 (1984); School District No. 1. v. Department of Indus., Labor
and Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
130 Seiz, 437 A.2d at 1345. See also McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 675
P.2d 159 (1983) (stress disorder compensable as occupational disease where actual occupational
stress conditions were the major contributing cause of disability).
We recognize that [if we conclude the occupational disease law allows compensation for
mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job stressful events or conditions, that in-
terpretation of the statute] may open a floodgate of claims from workers who simply cannot
mentally cope with usual working conditions. Researchers tell us that people who suffer
from psychological problems occupy more hospital beds in the United States than those
who have a physical illness or injury. It is estimated that at any given time between 15 and
30 percent of the general population have diminished efficiency as a result of some type of
mental or emotional dysfunction. The legislature must have been aware of the shift in costs
from general welfare or general insurance to workers' compensation that would occur if
workers' compensation provided coverage for mental and physical disorders caused by job
stress.
Id. at 162,675 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted). Seealso Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23,
495 P.2d 148 (1972) (anxiety reaction precipitated by argument but due to gradual occupational
stress held noncompensable). "[T]o grant petitioner his requested relief would literally open Pan-
dora's Box permitting compensation to any disgruntled employee who leaves his job in a huff be-
cause of an emotional disturbance." Id. at 25, 495 P.2d at 150.
131 See, e.g., School Dist. No. 1., 62 Wis. 2d at 370, 215 N.W.2d at 373; Millar v. Town of Newburgh,
43 A.D.2d 641, 652, 349 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1973).
132 See, e.g., Williams v. Western Elec., 178 NJ. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981). The court noted:
[W]here, by reason of a diseased mind, a worker's perception of his employment makes his
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compensation for mental disability which courts and legislatures deem
unwise due to economic considerations. The rationales are the same as
those employed earlier in this century when many states excluded certain
occupational diseases and cumulative physical injuries from workers'
compensation. In many jurisdictions, once the analytical straight jacket
of "injury by accident" was surmounted, the "arise out of" standard
proved to be sufficiently elastic to include cumulative physical injuries.
The fact that many mental-mental decisions have questioned whether
mental disabilities "arise out of" employment reflects policy concerns
over the economic repercussions of allowing such claims and an inherent
distrust of psychiatric disability rather than any real belief that employ-
ment does not play a causal role in precipitating such disabilities. These
concerns are illustrated by comparing the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Smith and Sanders, Inc. v Peery. 133 The claimant, employed for sev-
enteen years, suffered a "nervous breakdown" immediately after his
employer laid him off. His stress became apparent when he threw a tool
through a plate glass window immediately after being informed of his
layoff. The claimant, who had demonstrated nondisabling mental diffi-
culties during his employment, was diagnosed following his layoff as hav-
ing severe depressive neurosis, obsessive compulsive neurosis and
phobic neurosis caused by the notice of termination of employment. The
court, in denying compensation, concluded that the legislative purpose
of the Workers' Compensation Act was to provide compensation for inju-
ries arising out of and in the course of employment rather than unem-
ployment compensation or general health insurance. The court denied
benefits because the claimant did not show an unusual occurrence, acci-
dent, or injury incident to employment. The claimant thus failed to
prove that his injury was the type of injury covered by workers' compen-
sation. In the opinion of the Peery court, economic layoffs are not unu-
sual occurrences, and thus the claimant's injury could not be considered
an accident. The court cited both the economic consequences of holding
such disabilities compensable' 34 and the fact that the claimant had a his-
tory of prior mental problems. The court plainly concluded that com-
pensation of such mental disabilities was economically unwise and
employed an antiquated definition of injury to justify its conclusion. The
Peery court must have been aware, however, that under Mississippi law,
aggravations of preexisting conditions have been considered compensa-
ble injuries within the ambit of workers' compensation, 35 and that inju-
ries resulting from routine, as opposed to unusual, conditions were
condition more acute, we cannot grant what amounts to a lifetime pension at the expense of
industry .... In such case, the societal duty to aid must, because mental illness did not
arise out of employment, be met by some other quarter of society ....
Id. at 585, 429 A.2d at 1071.
133 473 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1985).
134 "Were compensation proper for Peery, benefits could be held to extend to any employee who
suffers depression or anxiety upon being rightfully discharged." Id. at 426.
135 SeeJenkins v. Ogletree Farm Supply, 291 So. 2d 560 (Miss. 1974) (The claimant's employment
from 1963 to 1969 gradually aggravated preexisting asthma which was held to be a compensable
injury although the employer was entitled to apportionment.).
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likewise compensable.13 6 The Peery court thus deliberately ignored pre-
vailing Mississippi law in order to deny compensation and to protect the
economic interests of employers. The Peery dissent noted: "Peery was
on thejob on May 22, 1981 when he had the experience which in fact and
in substantial part caused his disability."1 37 The dissent concluded that
the injury was within the course of employment in that it occurred at
work. 138 The circumstances surrounding the manifestation of the in-
jury-the notification of layoff followed promptly by the throwing of a
piece of equipment through a window by the claimant, the claimant's re-
quest for psychiatric help and the ensuing hospitalization-gives rise to
the conclusion that the notice of layoff at least precipitated the disability,
or substantially aggravated the claimant's underlying and preexisting
psychiatric condition. Thus, the injury in fact "arose out of" claimants
employment. Had the claimant's injury been a physical one, there is no
question that his disability would have been compensable. The Peery dis-
sent rejected the notion that there should be a special standard for
mental injuries, noting that a liberal construction of the workers' com-
pensation law is proper to accomplish its purpose as remedial social leg-
islation. The dissent stated further that Mississippi law provided that a
"mixed risk" (where a combination of employment and personal factors
cause disability) should be compensable where work aggravates, acceler-
ates or contributes to the injury, and that the "arise out of" standard is a
minimum level of causation.' 3 9 Furthermore, the dissent answered the
policy concerns of the majority by concluding that the inevitability of re-
cessions and resulting layoffs in a capitalist economy are precisely the
reason why any disability ensuing therefrom should be compensated, just
as any other occupational risk resulting in injury is compensated.
The rapid increase in stress-related workers' compensation claims 1
40
has resulted in an extraordinarily fertile legal field where states accept
and reject the standards of other states. 14 1 There has been recent legis-
136 See Schilling v. Mississipppi State Forestry Comm'n, 226 Miss. 858, 85 So. 2d 562 (1956). (A
heart attack caused by routine stair climbing at work was held compensable.). The court found that
"it is not necessary to show that the exertion which concurred in precipitating the harm was in itself
unusual or beyond the routine of the employment." Id. at 867, 85 So. 2d at 564.
137 Peery, 473 So. 2d at 427 (Robertson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
138 Id. at 431-32.
139 Id. at 429.
140 In California there were 1200 stress claims in 1980 and 4200 in 1984. WORKERS COMPENSA-
TION MONTHLY, July, 1986, at 27.
141 The "subjective" standard created by Michigan in Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 403
Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978) has been criticized or rejected by NewJersey, in Williams v. Western
Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 1063 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); by Oregon, in
McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983); and by Penn-
sylvania, in Hirschberg v. W.C.A.B., 81 Pa. Commw. 579, 474 A.2d 82 (1984). The Oregon decision
in ;1lcGan-ah cites analysis used by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor
and Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971).
The Wisconsin standard enunciated in School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 377-78, 215 N.W. 2d 373, 377 (1974) requiring greater than
ordinary stress was rejected by NewJersey in 1l'illiams, 178 N.J. Super. at 584, 429 A.2d at 1070, but
accepted by Maine in Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979).
This latter decision was in turn cited with approval by Wyoming in Graves v. Utah Power and Light,
713 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 1986). The much critized Michigan standard of Deziel has found some
support in California (Alberson's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d
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lative activity in this area as some states seek to limit the compensability
of stress-related claims. For example, Colorado now defines "accident",
"injury" and "occupational disease" as not including disability or death
caused by or resulting from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown
by competent evidence that such mental or emotional stress is proxi-
mately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not have been
equally exposed to outside the employment; 42 thus importing the "pe-
culiar risk" doctrine of occupational disease. Michigan amended its
workers' compensation statute in 1980 by requiring that mental disabili-
ties be contributed to, aggravated or accelerated by employment in a sig-
nificant manner by real events, not by subjective perceptions thereof.143
This is an apparent attempt to limit the subjective test of Deziel, although
the actual impact is unknown as of this writing since the statute has pro-
spective application only.14
4
The development of the law on stress injuries in Arizona provides a
particularly interesting example of the interplay between case law and
legislative response. The Arizona workers' compensation statute origi-
nally provided workers' compensation for employees injured by acci-
dents arising out of and in the course of employment. 145 The Arizona
courts allowed compensation for stress-related injuries 146 and noted that
to draw a distinction between a mental injury and a physical accident
would be contrary to the intent of the workers' compensation statute.
This rule was limited the next year by the Arizona judiciary147 to situa-
tions involving an "unexpected injury-causing event." 148 The court also
noted that the granting of compensation would "literally open Pandora's
box permitting compensation to any disgruntled employee who leaves
his job in a huff because of an emotional disturbance."' 149 This decision
was in turn distinguished in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission. 150 The Fireman's Fund majority found the facts presented suffi-
cient to rule that the claimant had sustained a "personal injury" arising
308, 316, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304, 308 (1982)), but fared badly at the hands of subsequent Michigan
decisions (Bentley v. Associated Spring Co., 133 Mich. App. 15, 237 N.W.2d 784 (1984); McDaniel v.
General Motors Corp., 129 Mich. App. 638, 341 N.W.2d 850 (1983)); and was criticized by Alaska
(Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1986)). The Fox decision was cited with approval in
RoVal State Nat ' Ins. (Hawaii), supra; Yocom v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976); VcGarrah (Ore-
gon), supra; and Breeden v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 168 W. Va. 573, 285 S.E.2d 398
(1981).
142 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(2.2) (1986).
143 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 1987).
144 See Hurd v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Mich. 531, 377 N.W.2d 300 (1985); Norwin v. Ford Motor
Co., 132 Mich. App. 790, 348 N.W.2d 703 (1984).
145 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1041(A) (1983).
146 See, e.g., Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971) (Employee with
preexisting psychiatric problems which were aggravated by incident where he killed a pedestrian
while driving a city truck was granted compensation.).
147 Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972) (Relief foremen in body
shop who had long standing job difficulties denied compensation after argument with customer
brought difficulties to a head.).
148 Id. at 24, 495 P.2d at 149.
149 Id. at 25, 495 P.2d at 150.
150 119 Ariz. 51, 579 P.2d 555 (1978) (Claimant who suffered mental breakdown as a result of
additional responsibility and mounting pressure awarded compensation; affirmed Brock, 15 Ariz.
App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971)).
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out of and in the course of employment. 15  The dissent summarized the
inherent conflict in workers' compensation as follows:
Although the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally con-
strued to meet its intended purpose, we must not lose sight of the fact
that the Act was not intended to be a general health and accident in-
surance substitute .... Today's approval of the award for a mental
condition brought about by the gradual buildup of emotional stress
over a period of time, without an injury causing event, paves the way
for tomorrow's abuses of the workmen's compensation system.'
52-
This controversy was laid to rest in Arizona, at least for the time
being, by the passage in 1980 of a statute which provides that a mental
injury shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of employment unless some unexpected, unusual or
extraordinary stress or some physical injury was a substantial contribut-
ing factor of the condition.
153
Individual states also disagree as to whether to consider mental disa-
bilities as an injury or as an occupational disease. The majority of states
treat mental disability as an injury. The nature of occupational disease
legislation, which typically lists specific diseases that are peculiar to cer-
tain occupations and/or provides a general category of diseases which
must meet a requirement of being more prevalent in the occupation than
in the general population, tends to discourage this type of claim. 154 Ore-
gon has the most developed case law allowing compensation for mental
disabilities caused by mental stress. The Oregon Workers' Compensa-
tion statute defines an occupational disease as any disease which arises
out of and in the scope of employment and to which an employee is not
ordinarily subjected or exposed other than during a period of regular
actual employment.155 The Oregon Supreme Court interpreted this stat-
ute as allowing compensation where occupational factors are the major
contributing cause of disability.' 5 6 Thus, Oregon treats mental disabili-
ties on the same footing as any other occupational disease.' 57
Some divergence of opinion exists as to whether or not the Texas
Legislature intended to include gradually induced mental stress disabili-
151 Id. at 55, 579 P.2d at 559.
152 Id. at 55, 579 P.2d at 559 (Gordon, J. dissenting).
153 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1043.01(B) (1983). It is interesting to note that the Arizona stat-
ute does not require a showing of unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress in order to recover
compensation for heart disabilities. See Bush v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ariz. 522, 667 P.2d 222
(1983).
154 See Marable v. Singer Business Machs., 92 N.M. 261, 586 P.2d 1090 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978),
where the court held that neurotic mental depression suffered by a female employee as a result of
harrassment by male employees was not an occupational disease because it was not a natural inci-
dent of the employment or linked with the process of employment. The applicable New Mexico
statute defined "occupational disease" as "any disease peculiar to the occupation in which the em-
ployee was engaged and due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment as such."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-1 1-21 (1953) (repealed 1984). See also Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d
859 (Alaska 1985).
155 OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(l) (1983).
156 McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 166, 675 P.2d 159, 172 (1983).
157 This rule is subject to the limitation that the stressful conditions actually exist, as opposed to
being merely perceived as being stressful by the claimant. Id. at 165, 675 P.2d at 171.
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ties within the Texas definition of occupational disease.' 58 The legisla-
ture's elimination of the schedule of physically induced diseases and the
substitution of a comprehensive definition of occupational disease as
"any disease arising out of and in the course of employment" suggests
that mentally induced occupational diseases are eligible for compensa-
tion under the 1971 amendment. 159 The Texas courts, however, have
taken a restrictive view of mental disabilities and have declined to extend
the definition of occupational disease to include stress-related
disabilities. 60
Interestingly, Ohio, one of the most conservative states in workers'
compensation matters, 16 ' has recently held that disability caused by job
stress may be compensable as a non-scheduled occupational disease.
The Ohio occupational disease statute defines occupational diseases as
peculiar to a particular occupation to which the employee is not normally
subjected outside of his employment. 62 In a 1984 case,' 63 the Court of
Appeals of Ohio held that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law
that disabilities caused by job stress can under no set of facts be compen-
sable as a nonscheduled occupational disease.
Colorado recently classified a stress injury as an occupational disease
in City of Aurora v. Industrial Commission. 164 The claimant was an under-
cover police officer who was in constant danger and was required to use
drugs as part of his cover. A fellow officer committed suicide and the
claimant came under investigation for drug use. The court upheld an
award for compensation, holding that the claimant's severe chronic post-
traumatic stress disorder was an occupational disease. 165 In Martinez v.
University of California,16 6 the claimants' anxiety neurosis sustained from
exposure to radioactive materials pursuant to his employment at a labo-
ratory was held to be a compensable occupational disease.
It is difficult to categorize the varying state approaches to mental
disablity caused by non-physical work stress due to the differences in
statutory language and the considerable divergence and overlap in judi-
cial standards. 167 One commentator 68 identified two competing state
158 See Note, Nervous Disabilities Induced by Repetitious Mental Trauma Held Non-Compensable: Trans-
portation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 33 Sw. L.J. 905, 911 (1979).
159 See Sames, Compensability of Aentally Induced Occupational Diseases Under Texas Workers Compensation
Law, 10 ST. MARY'S LJ. 148, 154 (1978).
160 See, e.g., Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979); University of Tex.
Sys. v. Schieffer, 588 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Williams v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n,
663 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
161 Larson cites Ohio's refusal to compensate mental injuries caused by occupational stress as
"distinctly out of line" with the majority. A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.21(a), at 7-585 to 7-591.
162 Ohio REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
163 Allen v. Goodyear Aerospace, 13 Ohio App. 3d 190, 468 N.E.2d 779 (1984).
164 710 P.2d 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
165 Id. at 1124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-41-108(3) (1986) defines an occupational disease as result-
ing directly from work and the nature of employment, which can fairly be traced to the employment
as a proximate cause and which does not come from a hazard to which the worker would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment. But see Hennige v. Fairview Fire Dist., 99 A.D.2d 158,
472 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1984) where workers' compensation benefits were granted to a firefighter who
became disabled due to perfectionist tendencies on the theory that he suffered an occupational
disease.
166 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425 (1979).
167 See Seitz v. 1 & R Indus., Inc., 437 A.2d 1345, 1348 (R.I. 1981).
[Vol. 62:879
STRESS CLAIMS
tests: The unusual stress test and the objective causation test. Under the
former test, a claimant must show that mental disability resulted from
workplace exposure to unusual, unexpected or extraordinary stress
greater than that experienced by the average employee. Under the latter
test, a claimant must establish a causal connection between the workplace
and the mental disability without a showing of extraordinary stress. 69
Another commentator employs the following categories: Gradual stress
mental-mental, potentially compensable with no requirement that stress
be unusual; gradual stress mental-mental, potentially compensable if
stress is unusual; mental-mental, potentially compensable if stress is sud-
den, frightening, shocking; and mental-mental, not potentially compen-
sable.170 Professor Larson subdivides his third mental-mental
category17' into the following subcategories: Stimulus causing nervous
injury;17 2 gradual stimulus causing nervous injury; the subjective causal
nexus test; job loss or change as stress; and stress as an occupational
disease. 17
3
An examination of the case law on mental injuries caused by mental
stress indicates that the above categories, while valuable for their ability
to distinguish different elements of the problem, are too general to dif-
ferentiate the subtle distinctions in existing law. This writer has identi-
fied nine different standards applied by the various state decisions in this
area:, Mental-mental injuries prohibited by statute; sudden stress
equivalent to accidental injury; mental-mental injuries compensable if re-
sulting from identifiable work-related incidents; mental-mental injuries
compensable on the same basis as physical injuries; gradual stress result-
ing in mental injury compensable-subjective standard; gradual stress
resulting in mental injury compensable if stress is real-objective test;
the three-tier test for mental disability; mental disabilities potentially
compensable as occupational disease-subjective standard; mental disa-
bilities potentially compensable as occupational disease-objective
standard.
A. Mental-Mental Injuries Prohibited by Statute or Decision
Several states explicitly reject the compensability of mental injuries
caused by non-physical occupational trauma. For example, Louisiana
workers' compensation law defines "injury" as injuries by violence to the
physical structure of the body.'7 4 Applying this statute, a Louisiana court
recently denied workers' compensation benefits to a claimant who be-
came disabled after a job transfer. 75 Nebraska follows a similar rule.
168 Comment, Workers" Compensation and Gradual Stress in the Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 865
(1985).
169 Id. at 848.
170 NEW LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE EIGHTIES, supra note 119, at 5.
171 A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 42.23, at 7-624 to 7-639.
172 Id. § 42.23(a)-.23(f), at 7-653 to 7-680.
173 Id. § 42.23(a), at 7-653.
174 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:102(7) (West 1985).
175 Jordan v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 455 So. 2d 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1984). It is interesting to
note, however, that cases which fit within Larson's first category-mental stress causing physical
injury-may be compensable under Louisiana law. See Danziger v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
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The Nebraska workers' compensation statute defines "injury" as violence
to the physical structure of the body. 176 In Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 177 the
Nebraska Supreme Court thus denied compensation to an elevator oper-
ator who spent thirty minutes in an elevator with a crushed and dying
man who had been caught in the elevator machinery. The resulting disa-
bility was held noncompensable because the claimant's stress was not
considered violence to her body. 178 It should be noted, however, that
this type of statutory language does not bar mental-mental compensation
in other states.1
79
The workers' compensation statute of Florida explicitly excludes
compensation for mental or nervous injury due to fright or excite-
ment.' 80 Thus, the Florida statute prevents compensation of mental-
mental workers' compensation claims.
181
A number of courts choose to employ or retain the most conserva-
tive definition of injury or accidental injury thereby denying compensa-
tion for mental-mental claims. These courts frequently note that mental
disability is not a hazard or risk peculiar to the given employment. 18
2
The majority of these decisions state an explicit concern that allowing
such compensation would unduly burden the employer. 8 3 This concern
raises the inference that the courts could have adopted a more expansive
245 La. 33, 156 So. 2d 468 (1963) (compensation for a stroke caused by occupational stress permit-
ted). Danziger was subsequently overruled by Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867 (La. 1972). But
see Guillot v. Sentry Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (Preexisting emotional condition
making claims adjuster more susceptible to extreme mental strain did not disqualify him from receiv-
ing benefits after he suffered job-related nervous breakdown.).
176 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(4) (1984).
177 4 N.W.2d 741 (Neb. 1942).
178 The Nebraska judiciary recognizes that its restrictive standard on the compensability of
mental stress claims places it in the minority, but sees the decision to allow such claims as a legisla-
tive decision due to the resulting major shift of resources from general insurance to workers' com-
pensation. See id. at 743. But see Magouirk v. United Parcel Servs., 496 So. 2d 55 (Ala. Civ. App.
1986).
179 See Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955) where the court,
construing a statute reguiring damage to the physical structure of the body, held that the word
"body" means the entire human organism, including the emotions.
180 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(i) (West Supp. 1987).
181 See City Ice & Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
182 See, e.g., Shope v. Indus. Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972) (anxiety reaction
precipitated by stress of argument with customer not compensable); Williams v. ARA Envtl. Servs.,
Inc., 175 Ga. App. 661, 334 S.E.2d 192 (1985) (increase in workload of housekeeper caused stress
disability); Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428 (1982) (employee
disability caused by termination of employment; employee had preexisting psychiatric problems);
Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968) (claimant suffered psychosomatic
paralysis after argument with supervisor); Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597 (Minn.
1984); Lockwood v. Independent School Dist., 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981); Smith and Sanders,
Inc. v. Peery, 473 So. 2d 423 (Miss. 1985) (notice of layoff aggravated preexisting psychiatric
problems); Kern v. Ideal Basic Indus., 101 N.M. 801, 689 P.2d 1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (claim-
ant's preexising psychiatric problems aggravated by loss ofjob he had held for 15 years); Daugherty
v. ITf Continental Baking Co., 558 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1976); Henley v. Roadway Express, 699 S.W.2d
150 (Tenn. 1985) (inability to adjust to shift changes aggravated mental disorder); Mayes v. United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 672 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1984); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Maksyn, 580
S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979) (newspaper editor succumbed to pressure of overwork; anxiety depression
held neither an occupational disease nor an accidental injury).
183 See, e.g., Shope, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148; lliams, 175 Ga. App. 661, 334 S.E.2d 192;
Hanson, 163 Ga. App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428; Smith and Sanders. 473 So. 2d 423; Kern, 101 N.M. 801,
689 P.2d 1272; .Iayes, 672 S.W.2d 773.
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definition of injury had they been less concerned with the economic con-
siderations involved. This emphasis on the concerns of employers is
oddly misdirected, given the ostensible purpose of workers' compensa-
tion statutes to aid disabled workers.
B. Sudden Stress Equivalent to Accidental Injury
Under this category fall cases where the stress is so unusual so as to
allow the courts to analogize to a traditional injury. The courts tend to
apply a type of "reasonable person" standard in analyzing whether the
average person would have or could have suffered from mental disability
after witnessing the particular event. An excellent example of this type
of stress-producing incident occurred in Bailey v. American General Insur-
ance Co. 184 In Bailey, the claimant suffered from a severe anxiety reaction
after watching a coworker fall to his death from a moveable scaffold. All
parties agreed that the experience directly produced the disability. Thus,
the question of a causal link between the stimulus and disability was not
in issue. 185
The requirement of a particularly shocking or startling event has
been diluted in some of the more recent cases.1 86 Most cases in this cate-
gory, however, are early decisions which, for their time, were taking a
progressive step in holding such disabilities compensable. The implicit
equation of such stimuli with a "reasonable person" standard in some of
these decisions is another example of courts' tendencies to apply the
negligence standards of tort to the workers' compensation system; a sys-
tem which was intended to be free of such technical legal concepts. 87
C. Mental-Mental Injuries Compensable on Same Basis as Physical Injuries
Another line of decisions allows the compensability of mental-
mental disability without explicitly adopting either the subjective or ob-
jective requirement. These cases also do not make a distinction as to the
type of stress, sudden or gradual.188 There is a subcategory of cases
184 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
185 See also Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976) (claimant
disabled after extricating severed hand of coworker from machinery; sudden severe emotional shock
equated with accidental injury); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, Inc. 25 NJ. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446
(explosion in boiler room terroized claimant), aff'd, 26 NJ. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1953); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 44 A.D.2d 739, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 637 (1975)
(secretary suffered psychological injury after discovering body of superior who had committed sui-
cide); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (claimant susceptible to
neurotic manifestations fainted into arms of a coworker after witnessing flash of light and became
disabled later after seeing the coworker).
186 See, eg., Guillot v. Sentry Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (sudden unexpected
firing of claims adjuster equivalent to physical injury); Sargent v. Board of Educ., 49 Md. App. 577,
433 A.2d 1209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (claimant's preexisting claustrophobia aggravated by hav-
ing to climb into sooty boiler once per year to clean it held an accident); Brown and Root Constr.
Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 1985) (claimant suffered hysterical conversion reaction after
supervisor reneged on promise of promotion).
187 Manson, ll'orkmnens Compensation andthe Disabling Neurosis, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 376, 387 (1961);
Comment, Georgia's Mental Block in ll'orkers' Contipensation, 36 MERCER L. REV. 971, 984 (1985).
188 See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr.
279 (1971); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 53 Haw. 32, 487 P.2d
278 (1971) (indemnification predicated not on the label assigned to the injuries received, but upon
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under this heading which, while rejecting an objective' 89 or subjective' 90
requirement, do impose a "preliminary link" between disability and em-
ployment. 19' Fox v. Alascom, Inc. is an excellent example of a state deci-
sion which explicitly took the approach of treating mental-mental
disabilities on the same basis as physical injuries and in doing so provides
an intelligent discussion of the policy concerns which underlie most deci-
sions in this area. 192 The Fox court first identified the "arose out of"
standard as a "political compromise" behind workers' compensation
whereby the employee surrenders his or her common law right to sue in
exchange for an assumption of the initial cost of compensation without
fault by the employer. 193 The decision noted that the question of
whether mental injuries arise out of employment is exacerbated by their
complex etiology, which in turn has led many jurisdictions to impose a
requirement that the stress be greater than normally experienced. 94
The Fox court rejected this approach because it only provides an appear-
ance of genuineness and is not required in physical injury cases where
causation is difficult to determine. The court concluded that requiring
such a "per se" showing of unusual stress violates the fundamental prin-
cipal of workers' compensation law that the employer take the employee
as found. 1
9 5
D. Mental-Mental Injuries Compensable if Resulting from Identifiable
Work-Related Incidents
The sole decision in this category moves away from reliance on
stress that is accidental in the most traditional sense of workers' compen-
sation-sudden and shocking-but still requires that specific identifiable
stressors be not too protracted in time in order to distinguish them from
stress that is gradual and cumulative. 196 The decision rejects the "honest
perception" test of Deziel 197 because it does not look to whether the work
the employee's inability to work because of impairments flowing from the conditions of employ-
ment-no unusual stress required); Yocum v. Pierce, 534 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. 1976) (disabling nervous
breakdown from work in sewing mill held equivalent to harmful change in human organism although
the employee had a preexising neurosis); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106
N.W.2d 105 (1960) (pressure from foreman resulted in aggravation of preexisting condition).
189 See hfta notes 208-22 and accompanying text.
190 See infra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., Fox v. Alascom, Inc., 718 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1986) (Employee's stressful relation-
ship with coworkers established preliminary link needed for presumption of compensability despite
other, nonoccupational, sources of stress.); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Workers' Compen-
sation Appeals Bd., 141 Cal. App. 3d 778, 190 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1983); Albertson's, Inc. v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982) (applied a nonsubjec-
tive standard where cake decorator suffered aggravation of psychiatric condition following stressful
conflicts with supervisor).
192 718 P.2d at 977. "We conclude that this case should be analyzed in the same way as any other
claim for workers' compensation benefits." Id. at 984.
193 Id. at 980.
194 Id. at 981.
195 Id. at 982-83.
196 In ie Albanese, 378 Mass. 14, 389 N.E.2d 83 (1979) (identifiable stressful work-related inci-
dents occurring over a relatively brief period of time compared with a twenty-year period of
employment).
197 See hfra note 199.
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contributed to or caused the injury. 198 The requirement of a "prelimi-
nary link" thus requires a showing that the employment played an active
role in causing the disability.
E. Gradual Stress Resulting in Mental Injury
Compensable-Subjective Standard
The decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Deziel v. Difco Labora-
tories 199 has been frequently criticised 20 0 and rarely followed. 20' This
case is credited or blamed for the so-called subjective test of mental-
mental injury. The Deziel court held that, as a matter of law, a claimant is
entitled to compensation if it is factually established that he honestly per-
ceives that he is disabled due to a work-related injury. The test thus op-
erates from the claimant's own perception of reality. The court noted,
however, the policy concerns opposed to such a standard: The possibil-
ity of malingering and the difficulty of substantiating such claims.20 2 The
Deziel court also listed reasons for employing the subjective standard: A
previous Michigan decision 203 had impliedly employed such a test; an ob-
jective standard would not suffice since psychoneuroses are inherently
subjective; the remedial nature of workers' compensation mandates a lib-
eral construction of the statute; and workers' compensation referees have
the ability to detect malingerers. 204
Criticism of the Deziel standard has taken two approaches. Critics
frequently state that the Deziel standard ignores the "arise out of" re-
quirement by not requiring that the perceived stressors actually exist.
The Deziel standard would allow compensation where the only causal re-
lationship between employment and disability was the claimant's own ir-
rational fears, thus permitting compensation for almost any mental
disorder. 20 5 Critics also object that the Deziel decision ignores the nature
of neurotic disabilities which seek to fasten blame for unresolved inner
conflicts on any convenient scapegoat such as one's employer. The be-
lief that most mental disorders stem from childhood thus leads to a con-
clusion that trivial employment injuries should not be permitted to act as
a "hook" on which neurotics can hang their troubles.20 6
The Deziel standard may be moot, however, due to the 1980 amend-
ment to the Michigan Workers' Compensation statute which provides
that mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual
198 See Fox, 718 P.2d at 983-84.
199 403 Mich. 1, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978) (superceded by statute/rule as stated in Bentley, 347
N.W.2d 784 (Mich. 1984)).
200 See supra note 141.
201 See, e.g., Hammons v. City of Highland Park Police, 421 Mich. 1, 364 N.W.2d 575 (1984);
Kepsel v. McCready and Sons, 345 Mich. 335, 76 N.W.2d 30 (1956); Lopucki v. Ford Motor Co., 109
Mich. App. 231, 235, 311 N.W.2d 338, 341 (1981). For a thorough analysis of Deziel, see Joseph,
Causation in Workers' Compensation Mental Disability Cases: The Michigan Experience, 27 WAYNE L. REV.
1079 (1981).
202 403 Mich. at 37, 268 N.W.2d at 15.
203 Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
204 403 Mich. at 26-27, 268 N.W.2d at 11.
205 See McGarrah v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 296 Or. 145, 164, 675 P.2d 159, 170 (1983).
206 See Diezel, 403 Mich. at 46, 268 N.W.2d at 25 (Coleman, J, dissenting). See also Joseph, supra
note 20 1.
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events of employment, and not unfounded perceptions thereof.20 7
F. Gradual Stress-Usual but Objectively Real and Measurable
Rather than Subjective
The jurisdictions of Pennsylvania and NewJersey employ a standard
for mental-mental injuries that does not require stress to be greater than
that normally experienced by workers in the same or other occupations
but does require that the stress be real. The earliest Pennsylvania cases
adopted a tort standard in denying compensability. 20 8 The current lead-
ing case in Pennsylvania is Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board.20 9 In Thomas, the court denied compensation, noting that "[d]ue
to the highly subjective nature of psychiatric injuries, the occurrence of
the injury and its cause must be adequately pinpointed. ' 21 0 The court
further stated that "we cannot hold evidence of an employee's subjective
reaction to being at work and being exposed to normal working condi-
tions as an injury under the Act."' 2 11 The court applied a reasonable man
standard by requiring objectively measurable work stressors. What con-
stitutes objectively measurable work stressors has been a troublesome
question since the Thomas decision. For example, verbal harrassment by
a superior over a period of eight years was held sufficient evidence of
something more than a subjective reaction to normal work conditions. 2 12
An engineer who had unfounded fears that he might lose his job, how-
ever, did not satisfy the test.2
13
New Jersey imposes a similar standard.214 In Williams, the court de-
nied compensation to the claimant who alleged that his work on an as-
sembly line aggravated a preexisting mental illness. The court, applying
a standard requiring objective evidence which, viewed realistically, must
show work to be a material contributing factor, found that the employ-
ment was a static fact and the claimant's schizophrenic perception of his
job was the moving and causative factor in his disability.
The New Jersey and the Pennsylvania courts cite cost 2 15 and suspi-
207 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.301(2) (West Supp. 1987).
208 See, e.g., Liscio v. S. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483, 24 A.2d 136 (1942) (young wo-
man's death from fright due to thunder and lightning without physical trauma held noncompensa-
ble). See also Stander, Compensability of Psychic hIjries, PA. L.J., September 3, 1979.
209 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 423 A.2d 784 (1980) (claimant disabled after watching television report
of refinery fire similar to a fire experienced by the claimant five years prior).
210 Id. at 455, 423 A.2d at 787.
211 Id. at 456, 423 A.2d at 788.
212 Bevilacqua v. W.C.A.B., 82 Pa. Commw. 511, 475 A.2d 959 (1984).
213 Evans v. W.C.A.B., 87 Pa. Commw. 436, 487 A.2d 477 (1985) (honest but mistaken percep-
tion ofjob harrassment that aggravates a preexisting anxiety neurosis is not an injury).
214 See Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 429 A.2d 1063 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981).
215 Where by reason of a diseased mind, a worker's perception of his employment makes his
condition more acute, we cannot grant what amounts to a lifetime pension at the expense of
industry or the ultimate consumer. In such a case the societal duty to aid must, because the
mental illness did not arise out of employment, be met by some other quarter of society
1l'lliams, 178 N.J. Super. at 585, 429 A.2d at 1071. If the claimant had a preexisting back injury
which had been made "more acute" by his employment, he would have been entitled to compensa-
tion. The New Jersey court was clearly concerned with the economic cost of compensating mental
injuries, as shown by footnote 3 of the decision, citing a present pragmatic legislative intent to "put
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cion of psychiatric injuries, 2 16 respectively, as policy concerns underlying
their reluctance to adopt a liberal standard. The importance of good
lawyering and a sympathetic claimant cannot be overemphasized. 21 7
The difficulty with the Pennsylvania and New Jersey standard is that
what may not be stressful to a normal individual may be disabling to a
claimant with a preexisting mental condition.2 18 It is questionable
whether adequately pinpointed stress guarantees a valid claim anymore
than a physical blow gives credence to a claim in tort.
One decision 219 has discussed the problem of which control group
should be used for the purpose of determining whether the job stress of
a particular employee is abnormal. Three possible groups were identi-
fied: Fellow employees, workers in similar jobs but with different em-
ployers, and the working world at large. The court regarded the first two
categories as preferable. 220 Some of these decisions221 have been candid
in noting that the standards for compensability of physical injuries
should not be applied to mental injuries since all mental injuries would
then be compensable.
222
significantly more money into the hands of the more seriously injured workers while providing genu-
ine reform and meaningful cost containment for New Jersey employers from unjustified worker's
compensation costs that are presently among the highest in the nation." Id. at 580, 429 A.2d at
1067.
216 See, e.g., Thomas v. W.C.A.B., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 423 A.2d 784 (1980).
217 In Williams, 178 NJ. Super. at 571,429 A.2d 1063, the court pointed out that the claimant had
filed two earlier petitions which made no mention of work stress, had twenty-one workers' compen-
sation hearings, and was "inherently unreliable." Apparently, the only coworker who testified for
him was terminated for sleeping on the job. Id. at 586, 429 A.2d at 1071. In Saunderlin v. E.I.
duPont Co., 102 NJ. 402, 508 A.2d 1095 (1986), the testimony of a psychiatrist who had only seen
the claimant for the purposes of trial preparation was rejected. A Pennsylvania court rejected a claim
for psychiatric disorder caused by exposure to noise, dust and other conditions where no testimony
was presented to show the extent of these conditions. Russella v. W.C.A.B., 91 Pa. Commw. 471,
497 A.2d 290 (1985). However, it accepted a claim where the objectively stressful work environment
was identified by the testimony of a psychologist. Bell Tel. Co. v. W.C.A.B. (Demay), 87 Pa.
Commw. 558, 487 A.2d 1053 (1985).
218 These decisions fail to recognize that assembly line jobs where employees have high psycho-
logical demands combined with little control over their work are among the most stressful employ-
ments and that even a "normal" job may be disabling to an individual with a preexising mental
disturbance. Note, Recovery in New Jersey Under Workers' Compensation for Mental Disabilities Caused by Job
Stress and a Proposalfor Change, 15 RUtrERS L.J. 1033, 1054 (1984). For a current detailed discussion
of Pennsylvania law on the issue of occupational stress-related disability, see Comment, Gray Areas
and Gray Matter: Compensable Psychic Injury Under Pennsylvania Workmen s Conpensation Lan', 91 DicK. L.
REV. 583 (1986).
219 Graves v. Utah Power and Light Co., 713 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1986).
220 Id. at 193.
221 See, e.g., Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 46,
240 N.W.2d 128 (1976) (manager overburdened and berated by supervisor granted compensation);
Graves, 713 P.2d 187.
222 See PIMA Community College v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Ariz. 137, 669 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) (objectively measurable job conditions exposed claimant to greater than normal stress);
International Harvester v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm'n, 116 Wis. 2d 298, 341 N.W.2d 721
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (claimant witnessed coworker, a close personal friend, burn to death); School
Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W. 2d 373
(1974) (school teacher suffering nervous disability after reading student newspaper recommending
her dismissal denied workers' compensation); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874
(Wyo. 1984).
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G. The Three-Tier Test for Mental-Mental Disability
Maine has adopted a test which requires that unusual job stress be
the direct cause of injury, or that the ordinary stress of employment be,
by clear and convincing evidence, the predominant cause of injury, or a
combination of the two be, by clear and convincing evidence, the pre-
dominant cause of injury. This Solomonic compromise was an attempt
to "navigate the beacon of a progressive Act and the shoals of potentially
fraudulent claims coupled with the spectre of the employer as a universal
insurer." 22
3
The court summarized the competing considerations in its decision.
The factors which militate in favor of compensating mental-mental disa-
bilities include: The acceptance of gradual, cumulative trauma in physi-
cal injury cases; the acceptance of physical trauma leading to mental
injury and mental stimulus leading to physical injury; a difficulty in sepa-
rating gradual from sudden mental injuries; and the liberal interpretation
to be given the Workers' Compensation Act.224 Factors militating
against such awards include: Fears of illusory claims; difficulty in estab-
lishing the cause of neurosis; and fear that simply requiring a "causal
connection" between employment and disability would result in the com-
pensability of virtually every mental condition and thus, in general,
health insurance funded by employers. 225
The concept behind Maine's unique standard is that the requirement
of greater than normal stress would act as a buffer against malingering
claims and the spectre of general insurance. Nonetheless, those predis-
posed to mental injury could recover if they could meet the second test.
H. Mental Disabilities Potentially Compensable as Occupational Diseases
Of the minority of jurisdictions that have treated or considered
treating mental-mental disabilities as injuries, Colorado and Ohio have
not discussed the imposition of either an objective or subjective stan-
dard. 226 A New Mexico court apparently adopted a subjective standard
when a laboratory worker developed an anxiety neurosis due to a fear of
death from exposure to radioactive materials. The court held the disease
to be occupational. 22
7
The remaining decisions employing an occupational disease theory
are from Oregon and vacillate between objective and subjective interpre-
223 Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Me. 1979).
224 Id. at 1016-17.
225 Id. at 1018-19.
226 See City of Aurora v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (stress disorder
suffered by undercover policeman held to be an occupational disease); Allen v. Goodyear Aerospace,
13 Ohio App. 3d 190, 468 N.E.2d 779 (1984).
227 Martinez v. University of Cal., 93 N.M. 455, 601 P.2d 425 (1979). The court stated:
If the claimant is incapable, by reason of his inability to view rationally his disabling condi-
tion and its genesis, how is he any less disabled than one who, in full possession of his
reasoning powers, can see and perceive a severed limb or a mangled arm? ... We would
make claimants with mental debilities more responsible for their psychic weaknesses which
to them ... are directly related to their work conditions .... This is not logical; it is not
humanitarian ....
Id. at 457-58, 601 P.2d at 427-28.
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tations of the work environment by the claimant. One case 228 involved
an "inflexible" older male worker who suffered stress related problems
(headaches, upset stomach and diarrhea) resulting from constant turno-
ver of younger supervisors, some of whom were women and some of
whom gave conflicting instructions. The standard applied by the court
was whether work was the major contributing cause of disability. The
court held that the claimant's belief that he was harrassed, whether or not
it was true and even though his perceptions were the unconscious results
of his limitations, was sufficient to support an award. To require an ac-
tual finding of harrassment, according to the court, woud inject an ele-
ment of fault into the case.
In McGarrah v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. ,229 a supervisor's
vendetta against a deputy sheriff caused the claimant anxiety and depres-
sive neurosis. The court found it compensable since the events actually
occurred and were not simply conditions subjectively perceived by the
claimant.
230
In a 1984 case, State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Shilling,231 the
Oregon court held that occupational stress must be real and must be
measured in terms of the individual worker's actual reaction rather than
in terms of whether it would cause disability in the average worker.
The variety in state standards illustrates the uncertainty and com-
plexity of the law in this area and shows that the states are groping to-
wards an acceptable manner of handling mental injury workers'
compensation disability. All the previously mentioned classifications do
little to explain why the state standards are in such conflict.2 32 It appears
that much of the confusion demonstrated by the differing state standards
stems from not only a long standing difficulty in deciding the meaning of
the "arise out of and in the course of employment" standard and a preju-
dice against psychiatric claims as unfounded, but also from a deep-seated
concern over how far to extend the scope of workers' compensation stat-
utes. The courts continually parrot the long-standing assertion that
workers' compensation was never intended as a substitute for general
accident insurance. This conclusion is open to debate. The concern is a
real one, however, and is deserving of more intelligent discussion than it
has received. There is, in the words of one decision, an "elusive thread
of consistency" 233 underlying most cases involving mental stress;
namely, a realization that if mental stress claims were treated the same
way that physical injury claims are treated and the same causal tests ap-
plied, the result would be that an unacceptable number of workers' com-
pensation stress claims would be compensable. Since this is not
228 In re Leary, 60 Or. App. 459, 653 P.2d 1293 (1982).
229 296 Or. 145, 675 P.2d 159 (1983).
230 The court concluded that it was not its task to worry about "economic disasters" which might
befall employers if an expansive test was adopted. Id. at 160, 675 P.2d at 168.
231 66 Or. App. 600, 675 P.2d 1081 (1984) (increase in workload major contributing cause of
stress disability).
232 The states not only differ with each other but within themselves as well. Compare Albertson's,
Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 131 Cal. App. 3d 308, 182 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1982) 7ih
Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1971).
233 Seitz v. L & R Indus., Inc., 437 A.2d 1345, 1349 (R.I. 1981).
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acceptable as a matter of social policy, the courts have been required to
devise standards to separate mental stress claims deemed meritorious
from those considered spurious.
234
V. Conclusion
The real problem may be not that the issue is so complicated but
that it is so simple. The statutory and decisional law of most states
would, absent the restrictive definitions imposed, allow stress claims to
be compensated much as physical injuries are compensated by allowing
workers' compensation benefits where occupational factors play a signifi-
cant role in causing, aggravating or precipitating disability. The fact that
this result is unacceptable to most states has resulted in a complicated
series of requirements designed to distinguish these injuries from their
physical brethren. This result has been achieved not without some com-
promising of the liberal, remedial principles of workers' compensation
statutes. As previously noted, these statutes were really a political com-
promise between the interests of business and the reformist concerns of
the middle class to which the human toll of the industrial revolution ap-
peared too great a price to pay without some compensation. It may well
be that the present cautious approach to mental-mental claims reflects
the early concern that workers' compensation, as a pioneering social pro-
gram, move slowly so as not to upset this compromise. The English, on
whose system American workers' compensation statutes were modeled,
have long since adopted a system whereby any disability is compensated,
although those stemming from employment are compensated at a higher
rate.235 As of this writing, the current federal administration has pro-
posed some limited type of catastrophic illness protection. How far this
country will go in copying the welfare states of Western Europe, of
course, remains to be seen.
There can be little doubt that the compensability of mental disability
caused by occupational stress will undergo some expansion and clarifica-
tion, much as the treatment of cumulative injuries and occupational dis-
eases was expanded earlier in this century. Like occupational diseases,
however, mental-stress injuries will continue to be treated differently
than physical injuries in most jurisdictions for economic reasons despite
the resulting conflict with the liberal principles of workers' compensation
statutes. The historical conflict between the stated intent of these stat-
utes and their conservative application will thus continue.
234 The Seitz decision notes a reluctance "to avoid the creation of voluntary 'retirement' programs
that may be seized on by an employee at an early age if he or she is willing or, indeed, even eager to
give up active employment and assert a neurotic inability to continue." Id. at 1349.
235 See Lenhoff, Social Insurance Replacing ll'orkmen 's Compensation in England, 5 N.A.C.C.A. L.J. 49
(1950).
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